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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Background of the study 
 
The success of an international criminal justice system relies on effective co-operation. 
International criminal courts and tribunals are independent bodies, situated far from where 
the alleged atrocities are committed. Due to lack of their own enforcement mechanisms, 
they rely heavily on the co-operation of States to be able to try cases. They have, inter alia, to 
collect evidence as well as secure the appearance of the person in the Court. Unless the 
person appears voluntarily, which is highly unlikely, the person must be arrested and 
surrendered so that effective investigation and prosecution is conducted. In this regard, the 
Statutes of the two United Nations (UN) ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)1 and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR)2, established in 1993 and 1994, respectively, by the Security Council, have 
made the co-operation of member States to the UN, obligatory. 
 
Moreover, the Rome Statute,3 which establishes the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
under Part 9, deals with international co-operation and judicial assistance. Under Article 86 
it has laid down a general obligation on States Parties to the treaty, to co-operate fully 
                                                            
1 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/Res/827(here after 
ICTY Statute) 
2 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. S/Res.955 (here after ICTR 
Statute) 
3 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/99.(here after Rome 
Statute) 
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during its investigation and prosecution of international crimes. Also, under Article 86 (5) 
non-States Parties can also be invited on an ad hoc basis to provide assistance. If a State 
enters into such an agreement, it is bound to comply with requests for co-operation. Apart 
from this, non-States Parties will have an obligation to co-operate, when the Security 
Council, acting under its Chapter VII powers, refers the matter to the Court and decides that 
they shall co-operate with the Court. As stated under Article 89 of the Rome Statute, one 
form of co-operation required of these States Parties or non-State Parties relates to the arrest 
and surrender the suspect to the Court. This latter provision is the key provision of the 
Statute as the presence of the person, according to Article 63(1), is a necessary condition 
which has to be fulfilled in order for the Court to proceed with the case i.e. trial in absentia is 
not allowed. 
 
1.2  Research question 
 
Article 89 and the subsequent provisions deal with the procedure relating to the request for 
arrest and surrender, how competing requests are to be resolved, as well as the formal 
requirements of the request. However, the study attempts to address following eminently 
practical relevant questions, as the Statute deals with such issues only indirectly and 
insufficiently. These include: 
 
- What would be the effect of a States’ refusal, which might happen by inaction, to co-
operate with the Court? What would be the ultimate effect of a Security Council referral 
in such situations?; 
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- How does one deal with a State’s failure to implement in its domestic law mechanisms 
securing co-operation with the ICC regarding arrest and surrender?; 
- What is the effect of Article 98 of the Statue, which relieves the State in which the 
suspect is found from surrendering the person, when it is inconsistent with the 
obligation of the State under international law, with respect to the State or diplomatic 
immunity of the person or an international agreement?; and 
- What role can international/intergovernmental organisations play in the arrest and 
surrender of suspects? 
 
1.3  Significance of the study 
 
The study attempts to identify the concrete mechanisms inherent in the co-operation regime 
of the ICC in relation to the arrest and surrender of suspects. By doing so, it attempts to 
contribute to a better understanding of the procedural mechanisms pertinent to the question 
of arrest and surrender, thereby augmenting the emerging body of international literature 
focusing on this issue. Moreover, by examining real cases will identify practical deviations 
and suggests measures that need to be considered to remedy the problem. It is important 
that the procedures are clarified and followed properly. Otherwise, the ICC will lose 
credibility internationally, thus undermining the purpose of its creation, which was to 
combat impunity and to contribute towards achieving justice, peace and well being 
worldwide. 
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1.4  Methodology  
 
The study will be largely an analysis of the provisions of the Rome Statute. The study will 
also take a brief look at the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and the cases that are currently 
before the ICC. This is in addition to the reference that will be made to other international 
instruments, national laws, books, articles, reports and internet sources. 
 
1.5 Overview of chapters 
 
The study will consist of five chapters. Chapter One is an introduction. It highlights the 
basis and the structure of the study. The Second chapter deals with the major features of the 
ICC. It gives a general overview of the establishment and organs of the Court, the trigger 
mechanisms, the complementary nature of the Court and a general discussion on State co-
operation. Chapter Three addresses the substantive and procedural aspects of the co-
operation regime of the ICC in relation to the arrest and surrender of suspects. It discusses 
the obligations of States Parties as well as the co-operation required of non-States Parties. 
Furthermore, it discusses the role of international organisations and the co-operation 
required of States in relation to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender. It concludes 
by discussing enforcement of non co-operation. Chapter Four will be devoted to the 
practical aspect of the issue under consideration. It will show, the extent of co-operation the 
ICC has received, in the arrest and surrender of suspects, in the current cases before the 
Court. The last chapter is the conclusion and a recommendation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: JURISDICTION, TRIGGER 
MECHANISMS AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS 
 
2.1 Overview of Establishment and Organs of the International Criminal Court 
 
A draft treaty with so many unresolved issues and details was laid before a conference of 
plenipotentiaries for negotiation in Rome where, after an intense negotiations and 
compromises on all sides, the Rome Statute of the ICC was adopted on 17 July 1998.4 The 
adoption and implementation of the Rome Statute raised profound and interlinked issues of 
constitutional, institutional, substantive and procedural law.5 A total of 120 States voted in 
favour of the treaty. Seven voted against it and 21 abstained.6 The Statute required the 
ratification of 60 States in order to come into force.7 A significant delay between signature 
and ratification was to be expected because most States needed to enact national laws in 
order to comply with the obligations imposed by the Statute, as they were specifically 
required to provide for co-operation with the Court in the investigation, arrest and transfer 
of suspects.8 The Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002.9  
                                                            
4 Bantekas, L and Nash, S International Criminal Law 3rded. (2007) 536. 
5 McGoldrick, D et al (eds.) The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (2004) 42. 
6 The countries that voted against were USA, China, Libya, Iraq, Israel, Qatar and Yemen, while the countries 
that abstained include Turkey, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Mexico and Ethiopia. 
7 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 126. 
8 Schabas, WA An Introduction to The International Criminal Court 3rded. (2007) 22. 
9 With the recent accession of the Czech Republic (which makes ICC membership among European Union 
countries universal), a total of 110 countries are now States Parties to the Rome Statute. Out of them 30 are 
African States,14 are Asian States,17 are from Eastern Europe,24 are from Latin American and Caribbean 
States, and 25 are from Western Europe and other States. See   
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/> [Accessed on 22 July 2009]. 
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The history of the establishment of the ICC spans more than a century and the “road to 
Rome” was a long and continuous one.10 Unlike the ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
of Nuremberg and Tokyo which were set up by the Allies to try Axis war criminals, as well 
as the ICTY and the ICTR, established by the Security Council to address the specific 
situations that existed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively, the ICC is a 
permanent international criminal court established by the Rome Statute, which is its 
founding treaty.  
 
One of the main reasons for the establishment of the ICC was to end the culture of impunity 
by holding individuals criminally responsible for violations of crimes prohibited by 
international law. The purpose of the establishment of the Court had also been described as, 
to “achieve justice for all”, “help end conflicts” and “remedy the deficiencies of the ad hoc 
tribunals”.11 Some also argue that, as a standing institution, its very existence will serve as a 
deterrent, sending a message to would-be perpetrators.12 The Rome Statute, however, apart 
from creating such an institution, has developed the content of international criminal law 
enormously.13   
 
                                                            
10 See “History of the ICC” <http://iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory> [Accessed on 7 June 2009]. 
11 See “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Overview” 
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/general/overview.htm> [Accessed on 7 June 2009]. 
12 Lee, RS (ed.) The International Criminal Court: The Making of The Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results 
(1999) 6. 
13 In this regard, one of the key innovations of the Statute is the protection and participation framework it 
creates for victims, according to which they could participate in the proceedings before the Court. There is 
now also the possibility for victims to receive reparations for the harm they suffered. See Rome Statute Supra 
note 3, Art’s 68(3) and 75. 
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The ICC is composed of four organs: the Presidency; three divisions (the Appeal Division, 
the Trial Division and the Pre-trial Division), the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP); and the 
Registry.14 As per Article 39(2) (a) of the Statute, the judicial function of the Court is carried 
out by the judges of each Division sitting in chambers. The function of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is to be carried out by three judges of the Pre-trial Division or by a single judge of 
that Division,15 the Trial Chamber’s function is to be undertaken by three judges of the Trial 
Division,16 and the Appeals Chamber is to be composed of all the judges of the Appeals 
Division.17  
 
The Pre-trial chamber plays an important role in the first stage of judicial proceedings. This 
is until, the charges upon which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial, against the person 
charged, are confirmed (confirmation of charges). Each Pre-Trial Chamber admits evidence, 
determines if a crime falls under the ICC's jurisdiction, and issues warrants.18 The Trial 
Chamber conducts trials and sentences the convicted.19 The Appeals Chamber hears appeals 
and has the power to reverse or amend a decision, or sentence or arrange for a new trial 
before a different Trial Chamber. 20 
 
The Assembly of States Parties (ASP), which is composed of one representative from each 
States Party, is not an organ of the ICC. However, it serves as management oversight and 
                                                            
14 Id., Art 34. 
15 Id., Art 39(2) (b)(iii). 
16 Id., 39(2)(b)(ii). 
17 Id., Art 39(2) (i). 
18 Id., Art 57. 
19 Id., Art 76. 
20 Id., Art 83 (2). 
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legislative body of the Court.21 Among other functions, it also has the power to consider any 
issue relating to non co-operation.22 
 
           2.2 Jurisdictional Issues 
 
Unlike the previous international criminal tribunals which were established primarily to 
deal with atrocities committed prior to their creation, although they have also been given a 
prospective jurisdiction, the temporal jurisdiction (ratione temporis) of the Court is limited to 
those crimes committed after the Statute entered into force.23 As regards its territorial 
jurisdiction (ratione loci) and personal jurisdiction (ratione personae), the ICC has a more 
limited jurisdiction than the general international jurisdiction “currently enjoyed by States 
or groups of States over jus cogens violations.”24  This is due to the fact that the ICC does not 
have universal jurisdiction. The Rome Statute therefore creates a treaty based regime, 
binding those States which formally join the treaty.25 As a result, the Court has jurisdiction 
only over crimes committed on the territory of a States Party,26 or if the accused is a national 
of a States Party27 or of a State that has accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction pursuant to Article 
12(3) of the Statute. The one exception is where a case is referred to the ICC by the Security 
Council, as it can refer a situation irrespective of the nationality of the accused or the 
                                                            
21 Id., Art 112 (1) and (2). 
22 Id., Art 112(2) (f). 
23 Id., Art 11. See also Schabas Supra note 8. 
24 Chibueze, RO “The International Criminal Court: Bottlenecks to Individual Criminal Liability in the Rome 
Statute” (2006) 12 Ann. Surv. Int’l & Comparative Law185, 202. 
25 Roper, SD and Barria, LA “State Cooperation and International Criminal Court Bargaining Influence in the 
Arrest and Surrender of Suspects” (2008) 21 L.J.I.L. 457, 462. 
26 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 12 (2) (a). 
27 Id., Art 12(2) (b).  
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location of the crime, once it has determined that there is threat to the peace and security of 
the world.28 
 
The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, define its’ material jurisdiction (ratione 
materiae). These are genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of 
aggression.29 As regards the crime of aggression, however, because of the difficulties in 
defining it, the jurisdiction over this offence was made conditional on a later amendment of 
the Statute.30 Even though the jurisdiction of the court is based on a treaty, and reservations 
to the treaty are not permitted, there is a possibility for a State to opt out of the Court’s 
jurisdiction in respect of war crimes for a period of seven years.31 
 
The crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression 
are described in the Statute as “the most serious crimes of international concern to the 
international community as a whole.”32 They are also described as “unimaginable atrocities 
that deeply shock the consciousness of humanity.”33 By their very nature, these crimes 
require a considerable level of organisation to be committed. However, the whole purpose 
of the Statute is to establish individual responsibility, a principle first enunciated by the 
Nuremberg tribunal, for these crimes.34  
                                                            
28 Ellis, M and Goldstone, R (eds.) The International Criminal Court (2008) 32. 
29 Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 5. See also Art’s 6, 7 and 8.  
30 Kittichaisaree, K International Criminal Law (2008) 206. See also Id., Art 5(2).  
31 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 120 and 124.   
32 See Supra note 3, Art 5.. 
33 See the Preamble of the Rome Statute Supra note 1, Para. 2. 
34 “Crimes against international law are committed by individuals’ not abstract entities and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.” See International 
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment of 1 October 1946, Part 22,447. See Also Rome Statute Supra note 3, 
Art 25. 
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The Court's jurisdiction extends to all persons regardless of their official capacity or 
immunities granted to them under national or international law. This means that any Head 
of State or Government, member of Government or parliament, an elected representative or 
a government official shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC, if the person is charged 
with one of the Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.35 
 
Moreover, national amnesties, pardons or similar measures that promote impunity for 
crimes under the Court's jurisdiction and which prevent the discovery of the truth and avoid 
accountability in a criminal trial, cannot bind the Court.36 However, the Court may, on a 
case-by-case basis, consider the outcome of credible alternative measures of accountability 
such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions.37  
 
            2.3 Trigger Mechanisms 
 
There are three procedures according to which referral can be made to the ICC. First, a 
situation in which one or more of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to 
have been committed, can be submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) on the request 
of a States Party.38 This can be a self-referral or a referral from another States Party. In this 
case, all States Parties can refer a situation to the OTP, which then has the responsibility to 
                                                            
35 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 27. 
36 See Amnesty International, ‘The International Criminal Court: Checklist for Effective Implementation’ 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/AISummaryCheck.pdf> [Accessed on 10 June 2009]. 
37 Werle, G Principles of International Criminal Law (2005) 66. This is taking into consideration the fact that in 
many countries the transition to democracy was not the outcome of the victory of revolutionary forces but 
rather the result of a compromise negotiated between the people holding power and the groups challenging the 
dictatorship. In such cases, coming to terms with the past requires special consideration. This was the case, for 
example, in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala and South Africa. See Tomuschat, C ‘The Duty to 
Prosecute International Crimes Committed by Individuals’ in Cremer, et al Festschrift fur Steinberger (2002)343. 
38 Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 13 (a) and Art 14. 
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evaluate the information in order to determine whether an investigation should be 
initiated.39 
 
Second, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, can refer a 
situation about the commission of one or more of the crimes  to the OTP whether the case 
involves a States Party or not.40 Where the Security Council has determined that there is a 
threat to international peace and security, and has referred a case concerning a core crime to 
the ICC, “this will more or less constitute jurisdiction, and will be sufficient for the 
Prosecutor to assume that there is a reasonable basis for investigating the crime.”41  
 
Third, the Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of an information 
received from various sources, such as States, intergovernmental or nongovernmental 
organisations.42 If the prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with 
an investigation, he/she will have to submit a request for authorisation to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber.43  
 
Be that as it may, Article 16 of the Statute provides for a power of ‘deferral’ to the Security 
Council. The latter, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, can request the Court, by 
a resolution, not to commence or proceed with an investigation or prosecution for a period 
                                                            
39 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 53 (1).  
40 Id., Art 13 (b).  
41 See McGoldrick Supra note 5, 82. 
42 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art’s 13 and 15(1) and (2).  
43 Id., Art 15(3) and (4). Currently, the ICC is investigating four situations. Three of the situations are self 
referrals from States Parties: the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Uganda; and the Central African 
Republic. The fourth is a referral from the Security Council concerning the Situation in Darfur, Sudan. 
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of 12 renewable months, if it has established “the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of peace or act of aggression." However, the Statute is silent on whether a States 
Party may request the withdrawal of a case which it had earlier referred.  
 
      2.4 Essential features of the International Criminal Court 
  
             2.4.1 Complementarity  
 
The principle of complementarity is the corner stone of the Statute. It concerns the 
allocation of jurisdiction between the ICC and national courts. According to this principle, 
the ICC may assume jurisdiction only when national legal systems are genuinely “unable” 
or “unwilling” to carry out an investigation or a prosecution. This implies that, the primary 
responsibility for punishing serious crimes of international concern falls on national criminal 
courts.44  
 
Unlike the primary jurisdiction established for the ad hoc tribunals of the ICTY and the 
ICTR, the principle of complementarity “thus assigns the primary responsibility for the 
enforcement of the prohibitions of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes to 
national courts, while providing for certain standards they have to meet”.45 This is pursuant 
to the Preamble of the Statute which states that, “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that, their effective 
                                                            
44 Benvenuti, P ‘Complementarity of the International Criminal Court to National Criminal Jurisdiction’ in 
Lattanzi, F and Schabas, W (eds.) Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) 21. 
45 Kleffner, J “The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive Criminal Law” 
(2003) 1 J.Int’l Crim. Just. 86, 87. 
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prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing 
international co-operation.”46  
 
As long as the matter is being appropriately dealt with by a national legal system, the Court 
will not have jurisdiction. This makes the ICC a court of last resort. In this regard, it must 
however be noted that, the matter stands in a different light when the Security Council refers 
a situation involving a non-States Party.47 
 
The Statute, apart from enunciating the principle of complementarity in the Preamble as 
well as in various of its’ provisions,48 also provides guidelines on how to determine what is 
meant by the “unwillingness” or “inability” of a State, specifying the requirements that 
trigger the complementary role of the ICC.  In order to determine the “unwillingness” of a 
State, the Court, having regard to the principles of due process recognised by international 
law, must establish whether one or more of the following elements occur:  “the proceedings 
were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding 
the person concerned; there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings and/or the 
proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they 
were or are being conducted in a manner which is inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
persons concerned to justice.”49 
 
                                                            
46 See the Preamble of the Rome Statue Supra note 3, Para. 4. 
47 Trifterrer, O Commentary on the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers Notes, Article by Article, 
2nded. (2008)13. See also Fletcher, GP and Ohlin, JD “The ICC- two Courts in one?” (2006) 4 J.Int’l Crim. Just. 
428, 428-433. 
48 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art’s 1, 17-19.  
49Id., Art 17(2).  
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The test of “unwillingness” of a State is in effect a test of good faith. It requires proving the 
intent of a State, as it involves a deliberate decision not to hold an accused accountable. 
This might not be difficult in obvious cases but it would be an intractable task when dealing 
with a State that may be effective at disguising its intentions.50 As far as the test of 
“inability” is concerned, it is defined in a more objective manner. Article 17(3) specifies that  
“in order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether due to 
a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is 
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to 
carry out its proceedings.” 
 
The adoption of complementarity is regarded as a compromise which emerged in 
negotiations for the ICC and serves as the delicate balance between the competing interests 
of State sovereignty and judicial independence.51 Moreover, it is based on the consideration 
that, national institutions are in a better position to dispense justice, for they normally 
constitute a convenient forum where both the evidence and the alleged perpetrator are 
found.52 In this regard, however, it should be noted that, “the principle of complementarity 
applies not only to jurisdiction to prosecute, but also to all aspects of the relationship 
between the ICC and national courts, including judicial assistance, [surrender] and other 
forms of State co-operation with the ICC.”53 
                                                            
50 Lee Supra note 12, 75. 
51 See Bekou, O “The Complementarity Regime of the ICC” 
<http://www.weltpolitik.net/Sachgebiete/Globale%20Zukunftsfragen/Internationaler%20Strafgerichtshof/A
nalysen/The%20%22Complementarity%20Regime%22%20of%20the%20ICC.html> [Accessed on 8 June 
2009]. 
52 See Benvenuti Supra note 44, 59. 
53 Brown, BS “Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International 
Criminal Tribunals” (1998) 23Yale J. of Int’l L. 383, 417. 
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           2.4.2 State co-operation 
 
State co-operation is one of the crucial factors that determines the credibility of the ICC as 
an independent and impartial institution. As the former President of the Court, Philippe 
Kirsch, noted in his 2007 address to the UN General Assembly, the ICC has been 
established on two pillars: a judicial pillar, represented by the Court itself, and an 
enforcement pillar, reserved for States, which by extension goes to international 
organisations.54 “Co-operation is the inter-play between these two pillars, where the judicial 
pillar requires the enforcement pillar to play its part in order for the system created by the 
Rome Statute to work”.55 
  
In the absence of an international enforcement agent, the Court’s decisions must be 
implemented indirectly by States. Thus, the enforcement of the Rome Statute is made 
dependent on national support (including through international organisations) for all 
matters pertaining to its implementation, inter alia, from the collecting of evidence, the 
security of witnesses, the conduct of searches and seizures, the forfeiture of assets, the 
execution of arrest warrants, to the surrender of persons.56 It is only effective, efficient, 
prompt and real assistance and co-operation of States that will guarantee the viability of the 
court.57 
                                                            
54 Kirsch, P “Address to the United Nations General Assembly.1 November 2007” Available at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/754F8043-22DB-4D78-9F8C-
67EFBFC4736A/278573/PK_20071101_ENG.pdf> [Accessed on 12 June 2009].  
55 Arbia, S “No Peace without Justice” Available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/76042F62-3001-
4C23-9D5C-4B3C8BD3BAB1/280578/Statement_Registar2.pdf> [Accessed on 14 June 2009].  
56 Rastan, R “Testing co-operation: The International Criminal Court and National Authorities” (2009) 21  
L. J.I.L 431, 431.  
57 Maogoto, JN “A Giant without Limbs: The International Criminal Court’s State Centric Co-operation 
Regime” (2006) By Press Legal Series Paper 1350, 13. 
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Part 9 of the Rome Statute contains the legal framework of international co-operation and 
judicial assistance. It addresses the interaction between the Court and States, in the conduct 
of investigations or prosecutions and in the arrest and transfer of suspects to the Court. 
During the negotiations in Rome, one of the key concerns was the relationship of the ICC to 
States and the obligations that they would have to the Court vis-à-vis their own citizens and 
citizens of other States.  
 
The extent to which, States by becoming parties to the Statute, assume obligations to assist 
the ICC in its activities on their own territory, is an issue of sovereignty. All the provisions 
of Part 9 of the Statute exemplify the differences during the negotiations, on striking the 
proper balance between national sovereignty and international authority.58 These debates 
are often framed by reference to “horizontal” and “vertical” powers. As first expressed by 
the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Blaškic  subpoena case, the terms attempt to describe 
the consensus based and a reciprocal legal framework governing interstate legal assistance in 
criminal matters, as distinguished from the hierarchical and supranational relationship of an 
international court with national authorities.59  
 
If the “horizontal” model is applied to international courts, except for the legal power to 
adjudicate crimes perpetrated by individuals subject to State sovereignty, the international 
court will have no superior authority over States. Neither can it force States to provide their 
                                                            
58 See Rastan Supra note 56, 432. 
59 See Prosecutor v. Blaškic, Case No. IT-94–14, 1997. Available at 
<http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/appeal/decision-e/71029JT3.html> [Accessed on 25 July 2009]. 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
co-operation, nor exercise coercive powers within the territory of sovereign States.60 In the 
second model, however, the international judicial body is vested with far-reaching powers 
vis-à-vis individuals subject to the sovereign authority of States as well as the States 
themselves.61 It will be empowered to issue binding orders on States and in cases of non-
compliance, may set in motion enforcement mechanisms, which, in short, endows it with 
authority over a State that manifestly differentiates it from other institutions.62 
 
The Rome Statute is regarded as creating a mixture of the “horizontal” and “vertical” 
regimes.63 In some respects, the ICC follows the supra-state model of the ad hoc Tribunals 
while other provisions of Part 9 reflect the practice of mutual legal assistance regimes 
between States, with a recognition that the ICC will operate with the co-operation of 
sovereign States. This regime as reflected in the substantive and procedural aspects of the 
provisions dealing with arrest and surrender are discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
60 Cassese, A International Criminal Law 2ed. (2008) 346. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 See Rastan Supra note 56. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE CO-OPERATION 
REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ON ARREST AND 
SURRENDER 
 
         3.1 General 
 
Going back to the ICTY, the ICTR, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, one of the most 
pressing problems for the international criminal tribunals was the arrest and the surrender of 
suspects, which often requires “substantial bargaining between the court and the State in 
which the suspect resides.”64 As demonstrated by the history of these tribunals, non-
compliance of States undermines the effectiveness of courts significantly. According to 
Robert and Barria, 
 
‘The inability to apprehend suspects not only undermines the credibility of a justice system but, 
more fundamentally, thwarts the prosecution of cases and ultimately denies the possibility of 
justice to individuals as well as the establishment of a historical record, which can serve as a 
basis for possible national reconciliation. Therefore, […] the inability to apprehend suspects [is] a 
more fundamental problem than just enforcement – [it] undermines the entire international 
human rights regime.’65 
 
In this regard, the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR provide the general and permanent 
obligations of all member States of the UN to provide full co-operation.66 States obligations 
to arrest, detain and transfer the accused, to these tribunals prevail over any legal 
                                                            
64 Roper and Barria Supra note 25, 458. 
65 Id., 457. 
66 See ICTY Statute Supra note 1, Art 9 and 29 and ICTR Statute Supra note 2, Art 28.  
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impediment under national law or extradition treaties.67 In general, the obligation of States 
to comply with requests from the Tribunals stems from membership of the UN.68 More 
specifically however, the Tribunals, having been established under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, are subsidiary organs of the Security Council and hence, their decisions or requests 
for assistance have been ‘equated’ to decisions or requests of the Security Council itself.69 
Unlike these tribunals, the ICC can enjoy the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
only when a case is referred to the Court by the Security Council. Apart from this, the 
obligation of States Parties can only be seen, as it arises from the Statute. The difficulty in 
apprehending suspects in the case of the ICTY and the ICTR is useful for the ICC. Hence, 
in the following discussion, reference will be made to the experience of these tribunals in 
relation to some points. 
 
      3.2 The obligations of States Parties 
 
Given the fact that the ICC will have to rely on its States Parties to carry out in their 
territories such activities as taking evidence, investigation and the arrest of a person, the 
crucial question is, the extent to which such States would be under an obligation to co-
operate with the Court. During the negotiation of the Rome Statute, delegations were 
divided on the issue of whether co-operation should be defined as a matter of legal 
                                                            
67 See Art 58 of Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY (IT/32/REV.22) (here after ICTY RPE) and 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR (here after ICTR RPE). 
68 See Art’s 2(5), 25, 39, 41, 48 and 49 of United Nations Charter. 
69 See “Remarks on the status and future of state cooperation with the ICTR,” Available at 
<http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/international_cooperation/papers_presented/Future-of-State-
Cooperation.pdf>[Accessed on 16 July 2009]. 
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obligation that the Court can rely upon or whether such co-operation should remain 
uncertain, subject to the will or circumstances of a particular State.70  
 
“The majority preferred the Statute to establish a clear duty for State Parties to fulfill the 
Court’s request and favored a formulation of the duty in terms of ‘compliance’ with requests 
as opposed to ‘co-operation’, which was seen as a generic term that might leave the door 
open for States not to fully comply.”71 After a lengthy debate, agreement was reached to 
recongise a “general duty” to co-operate with the Court. Moreover, rather than spending 
time on a general provision, it was thought more useful to strengthen the substantive articles 
to ensure that States fully co-operate at all stages of the proceedings.72  
 
        3.2.1   General duty to Co-operate 
 
The obligation of States Parties to arrest and surrender an accused is found in several 
provisions of the Rome Statute. Articles 86 and 88 are the basis of the obligation of States 
Parties to co-operate with the ICC. According to Article 86, “States Parties shall, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Statute, ‘cooperate fully’ with the Court in its 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.” Here, the 
meaning of the word “fully” refers to the principle of good faith, which in this context 
means promptly and with all due diligence.73 This general Article is supplemented by Article 
89, which specifically addresses “surrender of persons to the Court” and the ICC’s Rules of 
                                                            
70 See Lee Supra note 12, 305. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 See Kreβ, C and Prost, K ‘International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance’ in Trifterrer, O Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers Notes, Article by Article, 2nd ed. (2008) 1519. 
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Procedure and Evidence (ICC RPE)74 that govern specific aspects of co-operation, such as 
the arrest and surrender of individuals.  
 
The implementation of a request for arrest and surrender is regulated by both Article 59 and 
the pertinent provisions of Part 9 of the Statute. While Part 9 contains obligations that give 
effect to the request, Article 59 contains the method of implementation. The procedure for 
States Parties to execute requests to arrest and surrender individuals in their territories is 
straightforward. The Court, under Article 89(1), transmits the request75 together with the 
supporting material required by Article 91 of the Rome Statute.76 Upon receipt of requests 
from the ICC, States Parties must comply in accordance with their domestic laws, which 
must be in conformity with the provisions of the Rome Statute. In this regard, Rule 184 of 
the ICC RPE specifies that, requested States must immediately inform the ICC’s Registrar 
in the event that persons indicted by the Court are available for surrender. If the person 
sought cannot be located, despite the requested State's best efforts, or the person in the 
requested State is not the one named in the warrant, the State must then “consult with the 
Court without delay in order to resolve the matter.”77 The requested State is required to keep 
confidential, a request for co-operation and any other document supporting the request 
                                                            
74 See International Criminal Court Rules of Procedure and Evidence ICC-ASP/1/3 2002 (ICC RPE). 
75 The organ of the court which is competent to make the request for arrest and surrender is not specified under 
the statute. However, it is the Pre-trial chamber which is regarded as the competent organ to make the request. 
See Kreβ and Prost Supra note 73, 1539. As per Art 87(1)(a), the request for co-operation shall be transmitted 
through the diplomatic channel or any other appropriate channel as may be designated by each State Party 
upon ratification, acceptance, approval or accession of the Rome statute. Also Art 87(b) provides that such 
request may also be transmitted through the International Police Organisation (INTERPOL) or any 
appropriate regional organisation. 
76 According to Art 89(2) request  for co-operation or any other document supporting the request shall either be 
in or be accompanied by a translation into an official language of the requested State or one of the working 
languages of  the Court, in accordance with the choice made by that State upon ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession. 
77 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 97(b). 
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except to the extent that the disclosure is necessary for the execution of the request.78 This 
duty of confidentiality applies even for non-States Parties.79 
 
        3.2.1.1 Arrest  
 
In the vast majority of cases, national authorities must arrest the person before they 
surrender the person for the purpose of prosecution. “Without arrests there can be no trials 
and without the trials victims will again be denied justice and potential perpetrators may be 
encouraged to commit new crimes with the hope of impunity”.80 As the Court does not have 
the power to arrest these persons, it is dependent on States or international organisations to 
do so. Thus, ensuring the necessary co-operation is a major challenge for the ICC. 
  
Article 58 regulates the issuing of an arrest warrant. Pursuant to Article 58(1) (a), the 
Prosecutor must meet the burden of proving “reasonable grounds”, which is regarded as the 
minimum standard, the actual standard which is to be applied by the pre-trial chamber 
could be higher.81 Article 58(1)(b) further lists three purposes that the arrest should serve, 
which shows that the person must be arrested for specific reasons. These include; ensuring 
the person’s appearance at trial as there is no trial in absentia, prevent interference with 
investigations, and to prevent further or continuing commission of an offence within the 
Court’s jurisdiction.  
 
                                                            
78 Id., Art 87(3). 
79 Kreβ and Prost Supra note 73, 1519. 
80 Blattmann, R and Bowman, K “Achievements and Problems of the International Criminal Court” (2008) 6 
J.Int’l Crim. Just. 711, 723. 
81 Sluiter, G “The Surrender of War Criminals to the International Criminal Court” (2003) 25 Loy.L.A.Int’l & 
Comp. L.Rev. 605, 618. 
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During the negotiation, the term ‘arrest’ raised the question as to whether States could use 
their national custodial powers or would need to follow the ICC’s specific arrest procedures 
to take individuals into custody.82 This question was related to the issue of co-operation. 
Some argued that, since national laws vary, the use of those laws could limit the Court’s 
ability to discharge its basic functions, whereas others maintained that, any derogation from 
their national laws is considered an invasion of sovereignty.83 States finally agreed to a 
compromise that the Rome Statute would refer to both the obligations to arrest and 
surrender and acknowledge procedures under domestic law.84 Article 58(5) of the Rome 
Statute connects the issuing of the arrest warrant with the issuing of a request for arrest and 
surrender to a State. Accordingly, the Court may issue such a request under Part 9, only 
after an arrest warrant has been issued under Article 58.85 
 
Pursuant to Article 58(7) of the Statute, a Chamber shall issue a summons to appear as an 
alternative to a warrant of arrest, in situations where a summons is sufficient to ensure the 
person's appearance before the Court, as well as in situations where the person can and will 
appear voluntarily before the Court, without the necessity of presenting a request 
for arrest and surrender. It serves as the only alternative to an arrest warrant, to secure the 
appearance of the person before the Court. From a human rights perspective, this 
                                                            
82 See Maogoto Supra note 57, 27. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Oosterveld, V et al “The Cooperation of States with the International Criminal Court” (2002) 25 Fordham 
Int’l L.J. 767, 770. 
85 Sluiter Supra note 81, 619. 
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“alternative to deprivation of liberty” is less constraining.86 When the provisions were 
negotiated many delegates speculated that it would only rarely be put in operation in 
practice.87  
 
Once issued, a warrant of arrest will remain in effect unless otherwise ordered by the 
Court.88 However, there is no doubt that the credibility of the Court would be undermined, 
if an arrest warrant issued by the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber at the request of the 
Prosecutor remained ineffective over a long period, because the States Parties were slow, or 
failed to execute it.89 
 
In urgent cases, the Court may request States to arrest an individual provisionally, until the 
requests for that person's surrender and the required documentation can be provided.90 
Upon receiving this information, the requested States must perform the arrest and keep that 
person in custody until a request for surrender from the Court. If no request is made within 
sixty days of the dates of the provisional arrests, the detained person may be released subject 
to a subsequent arrest and surrender, if additional requests for surrender are received at a 
later date.91 
             
                                                            
86 Friman, H ‘Cooperation with the International Criminal Court: Some Thoughts on Improvements under the 
Current Regime’ in Politi, M and Gioia, F (eds.) The International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions 
(2008) 101. 
87 Ibid. 
88 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 58(4).  
89 Kaul, H-P “Developments at the International Criminal Court: Construction Site For More Justice: The 
International Criminal Court After Two Years” (2005) 99 A.J.I.L 370,  383. 
90 For example, when the ICC receives information that a person is preparing to flee the jurisdiction. See Rome 
Statute Supra note 3, Art 92. See also Oosterveld Supra note 84. 
91 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art’s 92(3) and (4). See also ICC RPE Supra note 74, Rule188. 
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            3.2.1.2 Surrender 
 
Motivated by serious concerns of sovereignty, the other crucial point during the negotiation 
was to decide whether or not arrest and delivery of suspects would be carried out within the 
framework of extradition or rather a new method had to be adopted. A majority of 
countries, however, argued for “a sui generis approach […]: to distinguish clearly between 
extradition and surrender by pointing to fundamental differences between them; to define 
surrender as unique form of co-operation between States and the [ICC]; and to frame this 
form accordingly by specifying its constituent elements with due consideration to the 
specific nature, organisation, and jurisdiction as well as the needs of the ICC”.92 
 
The solution adopted was to oblige States to ‘surrender’ persons to the Court, with the 
procedure to be followed left to the individual States, subject to certain limitations.93 This 
compromise is reflected in Article 102, which states that “for the purposes of the Statute, 
‘surrender’ means the delivering up of a person by a State to the Court, whereas 
‘extradition’ means the delivering up of a person by one State to another as provided by 
treaty, convention, or national legislation”. Accordingly, the Rome Statute requires the 
procedural requirements imposed by States for the surrender of persons to the ICC not to be 
more burdensome than those applicable to requests for extradition, taking into account ‘the 
distinct nature of the Court’.94 Most importantly, the Statute has done away with much of 
the traditional grounds for refusing surrender of a person, such as the political offence 
                                                            
92 See Maogoto Supra note 57, 28. 
93 Ibid.  
94 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 91(2)(c).  
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exception, double criminality requirement and the refusal to extradite nationals, and 
requires States Parties to comply with all requests for arrest and surrender to the ICC.95  
 
In the event that persons challenge their arrest before national courts on the basis of ne bis in 
idem under Article 20 of the Rome Statute, Article 89(2) stipulates that requested States 
must consult immediately with the Court to determine if there has been a relevant ruling on 
admissibility. If so, and the case was found to be admissible, then States shall execute the 
request. If an admissibility case is indeed pending, requested States may postpone surrender 
until the Court rules on admissibility. However the execution of the arrest warrant may not 
be postponed.96  
 
The requested State may also postpone the execution of the request when there is an 
admissibility challenge under consideration by the Court, pursuant to Article 18 and Article 
19 of the Statute.97  These can be seen as instances which show that the co-operation regime 
is influenced by the essential complementarity principle.98 The ICC will be most effective, 
where the State on the territory or by a national of which the crime was allegedly 
committed, is itself willing to enforce the requests of the court.99 Hence, the need for co-
operation will occur in many cases, when the State most concerned is “unwilling” or 
“unable” to take appropriate action itself. However, this will put in question the kind of co-
operation to be expected from such State. 
                                                            
95 See Sluiter Supra note 81, 612. See also Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 89(1).  
96 Cryer, R et al An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2007) 412. 
97 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 95. 
98 Cryer Supra note 96. 
99 Broomhall, B International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and Rule of Law 
(2003) 160. 
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In case competing requests for arrest and extradition or surrender are made to a States Party 
by a State and the ICC, the Court’s request takes priority if the case has been found 
admissible and if the requesting State is also a States Party.100 If the requesting State is not a 
States Party, the Court will retain priority if it finds the case admissible, unless the State to 
whom the request is made is under an international obligation to extradite a person to the 
requesting State.101 
 
The Rome Statute also provides for the practical reality that, on many instances, persons 
being surrendered to the Court cannot be taken directly from their places of arrest to the 
ICC's detention facilities in The Hague.102 Hence, Article 89(3) of the Statute and Rule 182 
of the ICC RPE address a situation where transit through a territory of a States Party as well 
as an unscheduled landing is needed, in States where the Court has not sought prior 
permission.   
 
       3.2.2 Duty to adopt Domestic Law 
 
In the field of co-operation in criminal matters, national law plays a continual role in 
shaping the scope of national obligations.103 When establishing the ICTY and ICTR, the 
Security Council, recognising that the absence of national laws and procedures would 
                                                            
100 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 90(2)(a). 
101 Id., Art 90(4). See also ICC RPE Supra note 74, Art 186. This is as opposed to Article 103 of the UN 
Charter which places the co-operation regime above other international obligations. 
102 See Oosterveld Supra note 84, 773. 
103 Sluiter, G “Obtaining cooperation from Sudan — where is the law?” (2008) 6 J.Int’l Crim Just 871, 877. 
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impair assistance, imposes a duty for the States “to take any measures necessary under their 
domestic law” to make sure they can implement requests for assistance.104  
 
Similarly, according to Article 88 of the Rome Statute, a States Party has a duty to ensure 
that its national laws provide guidelines for handling requests for arrest and surrender, and 
other forms of co-operation.105 The insertion of this Article in the Statute is of vital 
importance because requests for co-operation are to be executed in accordance with both 
Part 9 of the Statute and the procedures under domestic law.106 This is regarded to exemplify 
the mixture of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ regimes of co-operation best.107 States are expected 
to implement this duty in good faith, by effecting legislative changes at the national level, in 
a way that is compatible with Part 9 of the Statute.108 
 
A State cannot use the absence of a domestic law as an excuse for its failure to comply with 
a surrender request.109 However, the laws of some countries may contain a prohibition 
against extradition. In such cases, as the ICC is not a foreign court or jurisdiction, 
prohibitions against extradition do not apply.110 Where such a prohibition exists and is 
based on legislation, provided political will exists, States can implement their obligation to 
surrender individuals either by creating a separate legal procedure or amend existing 
                                                            
104 See ICTY Statute Supra note 1, Para 4 of and ICTR Statute Supra note 2, Para 2. 
105 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties, states that, “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
UN Doc A/CONF.39.27(here after Vienna Convention) 
105 Rastan Supra note 56, 434. 
106 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 59(1).  
107 Rastan Supra note 56, 434. 
108Ibid. 
109 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 89(1) and Art 88. See also Kreβ and Prost Supra note 73. 
110 See Maogoto Supra note 56, 31. 
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extradition laws.111 However, in the case of a constitutional prohibition, States can adopt a 
purposive interpretation,112 or a general constitutional amendment (for example in France, 
Luxemburg, and Portugal) or a specific amendment aimed at exempting the ICC (for 
example in Germany and Slovenia).113 
 
 It is very important that all States Parties adopt comprehensive legislation, as this will 
enable the Court to conduct its work without being repeatedly disrupted by States that do 
not yet have laws that allows them to comply. However, out of the 110 States Parties only 
39 States have adopted implementing legislation, among which only some of them adopted 
an implementing legislation incorporating their co-operation duties.114 Among these 
countries however, South Africa is the only African country that has enacted implementing 
legislation incorporating its co-operation duties.115 Countries like Republic of Congo, Benin, 
Botswana, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, 
                                                            
111 See International Criminal Court: Manual for the Ratification and Implementation of the Rome Statute 
(2008) 23. (here after ICC Manual).  
112 Constitutional and similar courts in Ukraine, Honduras and Guatemala adopted the extradition-surrender 
distinction in interpreting their constitutions as being compatible with the Statute in this respect. The Costa 
Rica’s constitutional court also held that the national constitution that protects citizens from quitting the 
national territory against their will, should be interpreted in the light of evolving international law standards. 
See Ibid. 
113 Ibid. See also Olugbuo, BC “Domestic Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Comparative Analysis of Strategies in Africa” (2003) 30, Available at 
 <http://www.up.ac.za/dspace/handle/2263/1069> [Accessed on 20 June 2009]. 
114 for example Australia: International Criminal Court Act No.41 of 2002, Canada; Crimes Against Humanity 
and War Crimes Act, S.C 2000, c.C-24, 2000, Finland; Act on the Implementation of the provisions of a 
legislative nature of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and on the application of the 
Statute, No.1284/2000, 2000, Germany; Act on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 
July 1998 (ICC Statute Act) 2000, New Zealand International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 
2000, No.26/2000, Switzerland; Federal Law on Cooperation with the International Criminal Court (CICCL) 
2001, United Kingdom: International Criminal Court Act 2001, See “Database of Implementing Legislation” 
<http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/hrlc/international-criminal-justice-unit/implementation-
database.php>[Accessed on 20 July 2009]. 
115 See Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, No. 27, 2002. See also 
Du Plessis, M “South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute” (2007) 5 J.Int’l Crim. Just. 460, 460-479. 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Zambia have a draft implementing legislation.116 In this regard, 
It is must be noted that none of the situation countries have adopted an implementing 
legislation. 
  
An agreement may also serve as a substitute for domestic implementing legislation on a 
provisional basis for a States Party where there has been a delay in its adoption, or it may 
regulate in a more detailed manner practical arrangements which would normally not be 
covered by primary legislation, in a way that is fully compatible with the statutory 
framework.117 However, the future of the ICC depends on all States Parties adopting the 
necessary laws that will enable each country to co-operate with the Court. 
 
In addition, it is not only the fact of adopting implementing legislation that is important but 
also the quality of the legislation that is adopted.118 For example, the role of relevant 
authorities in executing co-operation requests should be specified clearly. It has been argued 
that, as various countries have different kinds of laws, effective co-operation requires that 
the Court has good knowledge of the law of the requested State and frames its request 
accordingly, so that the desired result is obtained.119 
 
             
                                                            
116 See “The International Criminal Court: Summary of draft and enacted implementing legislation” 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/AI_Implementation_factsheet06Nov14.pdf> [Accessed on 22 July 
2009]. 
117 See Rastan Supra note 56, 441. Examples are co-operation agreements entered into by the ICC Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and with the government of Sudan 
(concerning the situation in Uganda). 
118 See Arbia Supra note 55, 6. 
119 See Friman Supra note 86, 93. 
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    3.3 The Co-operation required of Non-States Parties 
 
The only two situations in which non-States Parties co-operate with the ICC are, on a 
voluntary basis and because of a Security Council decision. There is no express duty in the 
Statute itself requiring non-States Parties to co-operate. However, Article 87 (5) authorises 
the ICC to invite any State which is not a States Party to provide assistance on the basis of 
an ad hoc agreement. If a State enters into such an agreement, it is bound to comply with 
requests for assistance.  
 
In addition, in cases of referral by the Security Council, duties of co-operation may also 
arise for non-States Parties. “It is likely that these duties do not find their ultimate basis in 
the Rome Statute, which according to the traditional law of treaties is res inter alios acta (a 
transaction between others), but rather are based on the decision of the Security Council”, 
in terms of which it may use its Chapter VII power to ensure that non-States Parties co-
operate with requests by the ICC for assistance.120 In this regard, all UN members, that are 
not a States Party to the Rome Statute, are obliged to carry out decisions made by the 
Security Council and these obligations prevail over any conflicting provision in other 
international agreements.121 
 
                                                            
120 Benvenuti Supra note 44, 61. Article 35 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, provides that 
‘‘An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the 
provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in 
writing.’’ Also, Article 34 of the same Convention provides that a treaty does not create either obligations or 
rights for a third State without its consent. See Wenqi, Z “On Co-operation By States Not Party to the 
International Criminal Court” (2006) 88 International Review of the Red Cross 861, 86.  
121  UN Charter Supra note 67, Art 25 and 103. 
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As was the case in the case of the ICTY and the ICTR, Security Council resolutions 
referring a situation involving non-States Parties to the ICC, should provide for a clear legal 
regime in accordance with which co-operation is to be undertaken. However, Security 
Council Resolution 1593 (2005), which referred the situation in Sudan, does not incorporate 
such reference. The language used in the resolution is that “[…] the government of Sudan 
[…] shall cooperate fully and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the 
prosecutor pursuant to this resolution [...].” However, it is not clear whether Sudan is 
entitled to co-operate fully only in accordance with its existent domestic law or Article 88 of 
the Rome statute, to which there is no reference, could be applied to Sudan.122 Göran Sluiter 
argues that, as no legal frame-work can be identified to cover co-operation relations between 
the ICC and Sudan, the Court may proceed on the basis of the Statute, as it is the only 
source of applicable law at its disposal.123 However, this is subject to various challenges that 
might arise from Sudan.124  
 
       3.4 Co-operation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender 
 
Article 98 of the Rome Statute recognises protections arising from international obligations 
relating to diplomatic or State immunity as well as those obligations arising from an 
agreement. In particular, Article 98(1) provides for a situation in which the ICC seeks 
surrender or assistance that “would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a 
                                                            
122 Sluiter Supra note 103, 876. 
123 Id., 881. 
124  For example Sudan might argue that it could not prepare for implementation of Part 9 like an ordinary 
State party. Moreover, the content of Resolution, gives no support for the imposition of a duty to make 
legislative changes at the national level. See Ibid. 
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person or property of a third State.” This provision has a substantive and procedural 
aspect.125 Substantively, it refers to “the State or diplomatic immunity” accorded under 
international law to officials of non-States Parties, found to be on the territory of a States 
Party that receives a request for assistance from the Court.126 In such cases, when the Court 
requests a State to surrender a diplomatically immune person, it must seek waiver of 
immunity.127 However, the reference in this provision to general international law raises the 
question as to the status of immunity under customary international law. 
 
Under customary international law there are two types of immunity: immunity ratione 
materiae (functional immunity) and immunity ratione personae (personal immunity). 
Immunity ratione materiae exists in relation to acts of any State official performed as part of 
his or her official duties regardless of where they may be performed. Accordingly, Immunity 
attaches to those acts also after the official has left office.128 Immunity ratione personae 
(personal immunity) on the other hand refers to an immunity granted to heads of States, 
head of government, foreign ministers and high ranking officials, regardless of whether they 
travel in an official or private capacity and for acts committed prior to or during their terms 
of office.129 Here, immunity is granted to ensure the effective performance of the functions 
                                                            
125 See ICC Manual Supra note 111, 39. 
126 This is due to the fact that States Parties by virtue of Article 27 are believed have waived the immunity of 
their officials as between themselves for purposes of ICC procedures. See King, H “Immunities and Bilateral 
Immunity Agreements: Issues Arising from Articles 27 and 98 of the Rome statute” (2006) 4 N.ZJ Pub. & Int’l 
Law 269, 280.  Additionally, Article 2(1) (h) of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that “third 
State” means a State, not a party to the treaty. See Vienna Convention Supra note 105. 
127 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 98(1).  
128 King Supra note 126, 272. 
129 Ibid. 
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and not for their personal benefit. Hence, it is limited to incumbent State officials.130 It is in 
this latter respect that the two types of immunity overlap.131 
 
What seems to complicate the matter is that, on the one hand, international law confers 
immunity for diplomats, heads of State, heads of government and foreign ministers, as 
evidenced particularly by the 2002 Belgian Arrest Warrant decision of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).132 On the other hand, the decision on the preliminary motion of 
Prosecutor v Slobodan Miloševic133 as well as the decision of the Special Court of Sierra Leone 
in the Charles Taylor case134, make it seem debatable whether customary international law 
recognises such immunities for international crimes in the context of international 
prosecutions anymore. The view among commentators tends to be in line with the latter 
two decisions. In this regard Gerhard Werle has maintained that, the denial of immunity for 
incumbent high State officials in case of international prosecutions for international crime 
                                                            
130Benzing M “U.S Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements and Article 98 of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: An Exercise in the Law of Treaties” (2004) Max Planck UNYB 8, 201. 
131 Cassese, A “when May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the 
Congo v Belgium case” (2002) 13 E.J.I.L 853, 864. 
132 The ICJ on the one hand stated said that immunity ratione personae does not allow for exceptions even for 
international crimes. On the other hand it stated that an acting Minister of Foreign Affairs may be subjected to 
criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, including the ICC regardless of whether the 
individual is a high State official of party States or nonparty States. See Case concerning the Arrest warrant of 
11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium). Para’s. 58 and 61. Available at 
<http://iilj.org/courses/documents/TheYerodiacaseedt.pdf> [Accessed on 24 July 2009].  
133 In this case the trial chamber explicitly stated that customary international law ensures that no person in 
whatever official capacity enjoys immunity before an international tribunal when that person is accused of 
serious international crimes. See Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševic, Decision on Preliminary Motions, Case No. 
IT- 99-37-PT,T.Ch.III, 2001, Paras.26-34.  
Available at <http://test1.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/tdec/en/1110873516829.htm> [Accessed on 
24 July 2009]. 
134 The Court stated that ‘the sovereign equality of States does not prevent a head of States from being 
prosecuted by an international criminal tribunal or court.’ See Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No 
SCSL-2003-01-I, Para 52. Available at  
<http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=7OeBn4RulEg=&tabid=191>[Accessed on 25 July 2009]  
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itself has become a rule of customary international law.135 Procedurally however, it is 
important to note that, it is the ICC which will determine whether immunities exist in a 
particular situation.136 This ensures that the States Party will be able to discharge its 
obligation to arrest and surrender individuals to the Court when required to do so.137  
 
Additionally, Article 98(2) addresses a situation in which a request for surrender from the 
ICC overlaps with a pre-existing obligation that the requested State has under an 
international agreement with a third State to ‘extradite’ or ‘surrender’ individuals to the 
sending State. This provision envisages the requested State to be a States Party or a State 
which has accepted co-operation duties with the Court, since other States could not be in a 
situation of conflicting obligations.138 It is maintained that, the term “sending State” refers to 
another State that has sent members of its armed forces onto the territory of the requested 
State under the terms of a Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) or Status of Mission 
Agreements (SOMA).139  
 
Where the sending State is a States Party, it will not place any constraints on the ability of 
other States to surrender its nationals to the ICC, since every States Party accepts the 
                                                            
135 He argues that in the case of crimes under international law, immunity ratione materiae is inapplicable not 
only to trials before international courts but also in national courts. In relation to immunity ratione personae 
however, there is an exception for prosecution by States for heads of State and government, foreign ministers, 
and diplomats while they are in office. See Werle Supra note 37, 174-178.  
136 ICC Manual Supra note 111, 38. See also ICC RPE Supra note 74, Rule 195.  
137 Ibid. 
138 Benzing Supra note 130, 199. 
139 These agreements provide exclusive jurisdiction over troops stationed in another State. See “Bilateral 
Immunity Agreements” <http://www.amicc.org/usinfo/administration_policy_BIAs.html>   [Accessed on 
26 July 2009]. 
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jurisdiction of the Court over its nationals.140 In other cases, mainly where non-States Parties 
are involved however, the Court will have to obtain the consent of the sending State.141 
Legal experts argue that, delegates involved in the negotiation of Article 98 of the Statute 
did not intend to allow the conclusion of new agreements, but rather to prevent legal 
conflicts which might arise because of existing agreements, or new agreements based on 
existing precedent, such as new SOFAs.142 They emphasize also that, the SOFA’s aimed at 
by Article 98(2) apply exclusively to ‘persons’ sent to another country on official, typically 
military business, by their State and accepted by the host State for that purpose.143 
 
Conversely, the United States has waged a campaign for the adoption of broad bilateral 
agreements referred to as Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) or Bilateral Non-Surrender 
agreements, with the aim of preventing surrender to the ICC of all US nationals, whatever 
the purpose of their presence in the other State as well as non-nationals working for the US 
government.144 By the end of its term, the Bush Administration had concluded BIAs with 
over 100 nations, quite a number of which are States Parties, the last with Montenegro on 
April 19, 2007.145 It has done so, as a reflection of its own interpretation of Article 98(2) and, 
                                                            
140 ICC Manual Supra note 111, 41. 
141 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 98(2).  
142 See “Us Bilateral Immunity Agreements or so called ‘Article 98 Agreements’”  
< http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164/28427.html> [Accessed on 26 July 2009]. 
143 Maogoto Supra note 57, 41. 
144 See Meyer, EM “International Law: the Compatibility of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court with the US Bilateral Immunity Agreements included in the American Service Members Protection 
Act” (2005) 58 Okla. L. Rev. 97, 125. 
145 See Supra note 142. 
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as a direct consequence of the conditionality for military and economic assistance to foreign 
governments set forth in the American Service Members Protection Act (ASPA).146 
 
As to whether the BIAs are among the international agreements contemplated by the 
Statute, there is a widely held view among scholars that, the drafters of Article 98(2) did not 
intend to provide an exception to the jurisdiction of the ICC as broad as the one included in 
the current form of the BIAs.147 Supporters of this latter argument argue that, among other 
duties, the BIAs conflict with the duty of a States Party to ‘cooperate fully’ with the ICC and 
defeats the main purpose of the ICC, which is to fight impunity as the States Party will 
surrender an individual to the US and not to the ICC.148 However, in deciding to make the 
request, it is for the ICC to determine whether or not these agreements are valid, which 
means, States Parties are required to fulfill their obligations to the Court when they are 
requested to arrest and surrender an individual. 149 
 
       3.5 The Role of International Organisations 
 
After the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), the ICTY, faced with 
continuous lack of co-operation by State authorities, was forced to turn to North Atlantic 
treaty organisation (NATO), which was the only armed force in the region capable of 
                                                            
146 See Scheffer, D “Article 98(2): America’s Original Intent” (2005) 3 J.Int’l Crim. Just.333, 350. See also 
American Service-members’ Protection Act 2002.  
147 There are three types of BIAs. The first type provides that both parties agree not to surrender each other's 
nationals to the ICC without the consent of the other party. Under the second type of BIA, the second State is 
prohibited from handing over a U.S. national to the ICC, but the United States may still surrender nationals of 
the second State to the ICC. The third type of BIA contains a provision "requiring those States not to 
cooperate with efforts of third states to surrender persons to the [ICC]" and applies for States that have neither 
ratified nor signed the Rome Statute. See Meyer Supra note 144, 129. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
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enforcing the Tribunal’s arrest warrants.150 The DPA established a multinational 
implementation force (IFOR)151 and granted it the authority "to use military force to search 
for and arrest persons indicted by the International Tribunal", despite which it contributed 
minimally to the ICTY's efforts to bring criminals of the Former Yugoslavia to justice.152 A 
year later it was replaced by NATO led stabilisation force (SFOR)153, which had done 
significant number of arrests for the ICTY until it was replaced by European Union 
Stablisation Force.154 “This set a precedent in modern history for having a multinational 
military force being empowered and directed to execute arrest warrants issued by an 
international criminal tribunal”.155  
 
The legal grounds for the ICTY to attain this result were based on the reliance on the 
extensive language of its’ statute together with the ICTY’s rule-making powers.156 Moreover, 
                                                            
150 Zhou, H “The Enforcement of Arrest Warrants by International Forces: From the ICTY to the ICC” (2006) 
4 J.Int’l Crim. Just. 202, 202. 
151 NATO founded IFOR to implement the military aspects of the DPA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was 
deployed in 1995 with one year mandate. See “Peace and Support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina” 
<http://www.nato.int/issues/sfor/index.html> [Accessed on 22 July 2009]. 
152 The DPA does not give explicit instructions to IFOR about cooperating with the ICTY or, in particular, 
apprehending indictees. However, it orders its signatories to comply with the ICTY and authorizes IFOR "to 
take such action as required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance" with the DPA. See 
Minogue, EC “Increasing the Effectiveness of the Security Council’s Chapter VII Authority in the Current 
Situations before the International Criminal Court” (2008) 61 Vand. L. Rev. 647, 671. 
153 The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) operated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, deriving its authority from 
UN Security Council Resolution 1088 of 12 December 1996. The mission was officially ended on 2 December 
2004. See Supra note 151.  
154 See Boas, G and Schabas, W (eds.) International Criminal Law Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY 
(2003)113-157. 
155 See Zhou Supra note 150. 
156Ibid. Art 19(2) states that ‘[…] the judge may at the request of the Prosecutor issue such orders and warrants 
for the arrest, detention, surrender or transfer of persons […]’. Moreover, Rules 54-61 were adopted by the 
court pursuant to the power of the Tribunal’s Judges to make Rules of Procedure and Evidence for any 
‘appropriate matters’ as provided under Article 15 ICTY Statute. However, in a further effort to prompt 
NATO in the enforcement of the ICTY’s arrest mandates, the Tribunal created Rule 59 which in sub Para.(a) 
provide that ‘[…]on the order of a permanent Judge, the Registrar shall transmit to an appropriate authority or 
international body or the Prosecutor a copy of a warrant for the arrest of an accused on such terms as the 
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in the former Yugoslavia, NATO forces were already deployed in the region and had 
“agreed not only to act as a peacekeeping force, but also to contribute to a significant extent 
in carrying out enforcement functions, including making arrests.”157  
 
The Rome Statute provides also two options pursuant to which international forces could be 
called for assistance. These are on the request of either the Prosecutor or the Court. In the 
event that the Prosecutor has decided to open an investigation, Article 54(3) states: 
 
The Prosecutor may:  
 
         (c) Seek the cooperation of any State or intergovernmental organization or arrangement in 
accordance with its respective competence and/or mandate; [Emphasis added] 
         (d) Enter into such arrangements or agreements, not inconsistent with this Statute, as may be 
necessary to facilitate the cooperation of a State, intergovernmental organization or person; 
 
The incorporation of the word ‘arrangement’ in sub-paragraph (c) is said to allow the 
Prosecutor to request the co-operation of peacekeeping forces.158 However, Article 87(6) of 
the Rome Statute addresses the relationship between the Court and intergovernmental 
organisations providing that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Judge may determine together with an order for the prompt transfer of the accused to the Tribunal, in the 
event that the accused be taken into custody by that authority or international body or the Prosecutor.’ 
157 See Zhou Supra note 150. 
158 See Kreβ and Prost Supra note 73, 1065. A Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and the ICC 
had been signed concerning cooperation between the United Nations Mission in the Republic of Congo 
(MONUC) and the International Criminal Court on 8 November 2005.  
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‘The Court may ask any intergovernmental organization to provide information or 
documents. The Court may also ask for other forms of cooperation and assistance which may 
be agreed upon with such an organization and which are in accordance with its competence 
or mandate.’[Emphasis added].  
 
Here, it can be noticed that a corresponding ‘arrangement’ to ‘international organisations’ is 
missing. However, commentators argue that the omission was not deliberate and thus, the 
Court is in a position to co-operate with all kinds of peace keeping forces within the latter’s 
mandate.159 As can be seen from the provision however, the Court may only ‘ask’ any 
intergovernmental organisation’s assistance, which may be agreed upon with such 
organisation. Apart from this, intergovernmental organisations are not under an obligation 
to co-operate with the Court or the Prosecutor. Consequently, the manner for the operation 
of such forms of co-operation are outside the co-operation regime of Part 9, which deals 
with the States Party obligations and are subject to a separate agreement.160 Therefore, apart 
from the forms of co-operation voluntarily agreed upon, international organisations cannot 
be obliged to co-operate, even when the ICC is acting pursuant to a Security Council 
referral.161 An example in this regard is the co-operation agreement concluded between the 
European Union (EU) and the ICC.162 
 
         
                                                            
159 Id.,1527. 
160 See Rastan Supra note 56, 444. 
161 Ibid. 
162 See “Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on Cooperation and 
Assistance”(ICC-PRES/01-01-06) <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/6EB80CC1-D717-4284-9B5C-
03CA028E155B/140157/ICCPRES010106_English.pdf> [Accessed on 15 August 2009].  
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        3.6 Enforcement of the duty to Co-operate 
 
Although the Rome Statute places binding treaty obligations on all States Parties, the ICC 
does not have an enforcement mechanism with which to threaten States to co-operate with 
the ICC. “Article 87(7) confirms the ICC’s power to issue a judicial finding of non-
compliance” where a States Party fails to comply with a request to co-operate with the 
ICC.163 However, the remedies in case of non-compliance depend on the mechanism which 
triggered the Court's jurisdiction. Where a State fails to comply with a request to co-operate 
by the Court, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers, the 
dispute may be referred to either the ASP or to the Security Council, depending on who 
referred the matter to the Court.164  
 
The Statute does not specify whether the ASP can impose sanctions on States Parties. 
Hence, provided that the ICC has no standing army or other forces to compel a States Party 
to co-operate with the ICC, various arguments are forwarded as to the measures the ASP's 
can impose. Some commentators argue that penalties are limited to actions such as denying 
that State's ASP representative vote.165 Arguing about the Statute’s ambiguity as to the 
precise legal status of the Assembly, the other possibility provided by Kreβ and Prost is to 
see the Assembly as an organ sui generis of the Court even though it is not mentioned in 
Article 34, and hence, it could on behalf of the Court invoke the international responsibility 
                                                            
163Article 119(1) of the Rome Statute provides that “[a]ny dispute concerning the judicial functions of the court 
shall be settled by the decision of the court. In this regard, Regulation 109(1) and (2) of the Regulations of the 
Court (ICC-BD/01-01-04, 2004) specify the competent chamber or the chamber that has made the request for 
cooperation as the competent body to make the finding. See Sluiter Supra note 81, 615. 
164 See Rome Statute Supra note 3, Art 87(7).  
165  See Minogue Supra note 152, 649. 
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of a State and demand its co-operation by condemning its internationally wrongful 
behavior.166 
  
It is argued that the ICC could have gone further and provided for the consequences of the 
Court’s finding of non co-operation by a State. Cassese argues that the Statute could have 
specified that the ASP’s might agree upon countermeasure or authorise contracting States to 
take such counter measures. He further argues that, even though the Statute does not 
exclude such a possibility, it would have been appropriate to expressly provide for the 
possibility of the Security Council stepping in and adopting sanctions, even in cases where 
the matter is referred to the Court by a State or initiated by the prosecutor proprio motu, 
provided that such refusal amounts to a threat to the peace.167  
 
On the other hand, a Security Council referral has the power of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter behind it, which the ICC could use to enforce its decisions. The Security Council 
can use its Chapter VII power to order forces to co-operate with the ICC. Apart from this, 
the Security Council has the power to compel States to co-operate with the ICC and to take 
consequential actions under Article 41 of the Charter by, for example, terminating 
diplomatic relations or imposing economic sanctions, against those States that do not co-
operate. However, “there is no precedent for the Security Council taking this kind of 
action.”168 Notwithstanding repeated notification by the presidency of the ad hoc Tribunals 
of the failure of certain States to comply, the Security Council has failed to take action 
                                                            
166 See Kreβ and Prost Supra note 73, 1525. 
167 See Cassese Supra note 60, 347. 
168 See Minogue Supra note 152. 
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beyond condemning non-co-operation.169 As has previously been pointed out, in the former 
Yugoslavia while it was NATO and coalition forces that had done most arrests for the 
ICTY, while in Rwanda, most arrests have been made by neighboring States (The recent 
arrest by the Ugandan Police of one fo the four most wanted suspects from the Rwanda’s 
1994 genocide, Idelphonse Nizeyimana, after he entered the country from neighboring 
Democratic Republic of Congo, can serve as a notable example in the latter respect).170  
 
Given the relative ineffectiveness of such a mechanism in obtaining the arrest and transfer of 
fugitives, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY had also turned to other non-judicial 
measures to obtain the co-operation from the recalcitrant States. These include, seeking 
assistance from the international community to arouse non co-operating States and also by 
creating strong incentives, such as conditioning aid programs and admission to international 
organisations (EU and NATO) for full co-operation with the ICTY.171  
 
Similarly, the ICC Prosecutor, in his 2008 address to the ASP, for example, called for 
“diplomatic and public support by States to reduce the political and financial support that 
indicted persons are receiving, to isolate them, to control the networks supplying them with 
money and weapon and to encourage demoblisation or defections of their combatants  and 
                                                            
169 Rule 7bis of the ICTY RPE provides that “In the event of a State’s non-compliance with Article 28 
obligations, the Prosecutor, a Judge, or a Chamber may request that, the President of the Tribunal report the 
non-compliance to the Security Council for enforcement measures.”  
170 Kaul H-P ‘The ICC and International Criminal Cooperation-Key Aspects and Fundamental Necessities’ in 
Politi, M and Gioia, F (eds.) The International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions (2008) 89. See also Supra 
note 69.  
171 See “Arrest and Transfer of Indictees: The Experience of the ICTY” Available 
at<http://www.icln.net/htm/Annual%20conference%202006/Presentation_Lopez-Terres.pdf> [Accessed on 
28 JULY 2009]. 
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also that, the territorial States, regional States with operational capabilities and relevant 
organisations to increase their coordination to plan and execute arrests.”172  
 
As can be gathered from the experience of the ad hoc tribunals, successful enforcement will 
therefore depend on the meeting of a number of measures. The extent to which States 
Parties have discharged their obligation, as well as the ICC has been successful in attaining 
co-operation from non-States Parties, in the execution of the arrest warrants it issued, in 
current cases before the Court, will be examined in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
172 Address to the Assembly of States Parties by Luis Moreno Ocampo.14 November 2008, <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/Sessions/Documentation/> [Accessed on 29 June 2009]. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4.  THE STATUS OF THE EXECUTION OF THE WARRANTS OF ARREST 
ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH THE FOUR SITUATIONS BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
       4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has looked into the co-operation regime of the ICC and some of the 
issues arising there from, with specific reference to the obligation of States Parties, the co-
operation required of non-States Parties and international organisations, and the 
enforcement of the duty to co-operate. This chapter will try to highlight on the actual level 
of co-operation obtained by the ICC, in the arrest and surrender of suspects, in the current 
cases, which are the four situations before the Court: the Democratic Republic of Congo; 
Northern Uganda; Darfur in Sudan; and Central African Republic.173 In these situations, 13 
arrest warrants were issued, among which only four were executed. 
 
         4.2 Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a States Party. On 3 March 2004 Joseph 
Kabila, the President of the DRC referred all crimes committed in the DRC to the ICC.174 
                                                            
173 Currently, the OTP is also analysing other situations including Afghanistan, Chad, Colombia Cote d’ivoire, 
Georgia, Kenya and Palestine.  
174 See “The office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opens its first investigation”  
<http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/the%20office%20of%20
the%20prosecutor%20of%20the%20international%20criminal%20court%20opens%20its%20first%20investigat
ion?lan=en-GB> [Accessed on 12 September 2009]. 
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Four warrants of arrest were issued by the ICC against persons in the DRC. The ICC’s Pre-
Trial Chamber I issued the first arrest warrant on 10 February 2006 on Thomas Lubanga 
Dylo. He is alleged to have founded and presided over the Union des Patriotes Congolais 
(UPC), a rebel group in the Ituri region, as well as the Forces patriotiques pour la libération du 
Congo (FPLC), the military wing of the UPC.175 The warrant also alleges that, due to his "de 
facto authority" over the UPC and the FPLC, Lubanga was responsible for war crimes 
committed by the FPLC, which included enlisting and conscripting children under the age 
of 15, and using these children to participate in hostilities.176 
 
At the time the warrant of arrest was issued, the DRC was holding Lubanga in custody on 
suspicion of being involved in the killing of UN peacekeepers.177 On 14 March 2007, the 
ICC Registry informed DRC authorities of the Pre-Trial Chamber's decisions, and the DRC 
co-operated with the ICC by sending Lubanga immediately to The Hague on a French 
military aircraft, with the help of UN peacekeeping forces in the DRC.178 On 29 January 
2007, Pre-Trial Chamber I confirmed the charges and referred the case for trial.179  His trial 
began on 26 January 2009, which made Lubanga the first person to be tried by the ICC. 
 
                                                            
175 The Prosecutor v Tomas Lubanga Dylo (Warrant of Arrest) ICC-01/04-01/06-2 Available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc191959.PDF> [Accessed on 12 September 2009]. 
176 Ibid. 
177 See Minogue Supra note 152, 655. 
178 Ibid. The UN Security Council also lifted the sanctions imposing a travel ban on Lubanga. 
179 The Pre-Trial Chamber I determined that there is "sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that Lubanga is responsible, as a co-perpetrator, for the charges of enlisting and conscripting children 
under the age of fifteen years into the FLPC and using them to participate actively in hostilities" See The 
Prosecutor v Tomas Lubanga Dylo “Decision on the confirmation of charges” Available at   
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF> [Accessed on 12 September 2009]. 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
On 2 July 2007, Pre-Trial Chamber I also issued a warrant for the arrest of Germain 
Katanga, formerly the highest-ranking commander of the Front des nationalists et 
intégrationnistes en Ituri (FRPI).180 The Court found reasonable grounds to believe that 
Katanga was responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes.181 In March 2005, the 
DRC authorities had arrested Katanga in relation to an attack against MONUC (UN 
Observer Mission for Congo) peacekeepers in Ituri on 25 February 2005.182 Thus, the DRC 
executed the arrest warrant promptly and surrendered Katanga to the ICC on October 
2007.183 
 
The third warrant of arrest was issued by Pre-Trial Chamber I is for the arrest of Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, an alleged former leader of the Front des nationalistes et intégrationnistes 
(FNI). The Court found reasonable grounds to believe that Chui was responsible for 
committing crimes against humanity and war crimes, due to his role in the implementation 
of the attack on Bogoro.184 Unlike the previous two cases, Chui was not in the custody of the 
DRC. However, the DRC authorities arrested him on 6 February 2008 and transferred him 
to the ICC.185 This demonstrates that, willingness to co-operate speeds up the execution of 
                                                            
180 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga ICC-01/04-01/07-1 Available at< http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc349648.PDF> [Accessed on 12 September 2009].    
181 The Court found reasonable grounds to believe that the FRPI and others attacked the village of Bogoro in 
the Ituri region, in February 2003, murdering, harming, and imprisoning civilians, pillaging the village, 
committing sexual enslavement of women and girls, and using children under age fifteen to participate in the 
attack. Ibid. 
182 See Minogue Supra note 152,657.  
183 Ibid. 
184 The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (warrant of arrest) ICC-01/04-01/07-260 Available at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc453054.PDF> [Accessed on 12 September 2009]. 
185 See “Arrival of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui to the Detention Centre of the Court.” 
<http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related
%20cases/icc%200104%200107/press%20releases/iarrival%20of%20mathieu%20ngudjolo%20chui%20to%20
the%20detention%20centre%20of%20the%20court>[Accessed on 12 September 2009]. 
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the Court’s request for arrest and surrender. Pre-Trial Chamber I joined the cases of 
Katanga and Chui, and conducted a confirmation of charges on 27 June 2008.186 Their trial 
will begin on 24 November 2009. 
 
On 28 April 2008, Pre-Trial Chamber I unsealed the warrant of arrest against Bosco 
Ntaganda, an alleged Deputy Chief of the FPLC and Chief of Staff of the Congrès national 
pour la défense du people (CNDP) armed group, active in North Kivu in the DRC, which was 
delivered on 22 August 2006 under seal.187 Ntaganda is alleged to have committed war 
crimes of enlistment and conscription of children under the age of 15, and of using them to 
participate actively in hostilities in Ituri.188 However, the warrant has yet to be executed as 
Ntaganda remains at large. Eventhough MONUC has been in the DRC since 1999189, the 
scope of its mandate in securing the arrest of indictees has been interpreted narrowly.190  
                
                   4.3 Uganda 
 
Uganda’s northern region has been overwhelmed in a violent conflict for 20 years. On one 
side is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony. On the other side is the 
                                                            
186 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Decision on the confirmation of charges) 
Available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf> [Accessed on 12 September 2009]. 
187 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda (warrant of arrest) ICC‐01/04‐02/06 22 Available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc305330.PDF> [Accessed on 12 September 2009]. 
188 Ibid. 
189 The UN Security Council established the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) 
on 30 November 1999. MONUC has the mandate to "co-operate in national and international efforts to bring 
to justice perpetrators of grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law" (Resolution 
1756 of 15 May 2007).  
See “Amnesty International: Arrest Now” 
<http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGAFR590082007&lang=e> [Accessed on 15 September 
2009]. 
190 See Roper and Barria Supra note 25, 470. 
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government of President Museveni and his army, the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces 
(UPDF).191 According to human rights groups, the LRA rebels are responsible for 
murdering, raping, maiming and torturing civilians.192 They are also accused of abducting, 
indoctrinating, and physically and sexually abusing young children.193  
 
Uganda is a States Party to the Rome Statute. It signed the Rome Statute on 17 March 1999 
and ratified it on 14 June 2002. In December 2003 President Museveni referred the situation 
concerning the LRA to the ICC. On 8 July 2005, Pre-Trial Chamber II issued sealed arrest 
warrants, which are the first arrest warrants issued by the ICC, for five members of the 
LRA: Joseph Kony; Vincent Otti; Okot Odhiambo; Dominic Ongwen; and Raska Lukwiya. 
They were charged with various counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
including sexual enslavement, rape, intentionally attacking civilians and the forced 
enlistment of child soldiers.194 
 
                                                            
191 “Information Regarding the Referral of the Situation in Northern Uganda to the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court” <http://www.amicc.org/docs/AMICC_UgandaQ&A.pdf> [Accessed on 9 
September 2009]. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194 See The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen. (Warrant Of Arrest For 
Joseph Kony) Issued On 8 July 2005 As Amended On 27 September 2005 available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.PDF; The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic 
Ongwen (warrant of arrest for Vincent Otti) ICC-02/04-01/05-54 available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97189.PDF>; The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic 
Ongwen (warrant of arrest for Okot Odhiambo) ICC-02/04-01/05-56 available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97197.PDF>; The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic 
Ongwen (warrant of arrest for Dominic Ongwen) ICC-02/04-01/05-57 available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97201.PDF>; The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic 
Ongwen ICC-02/04-01/05-55 (warrant of arrest for Raska Lukwiya) available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97193.PDF>;  [Accessed on 12 September 2009]. 
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On 13 October 2005, Pre-Trial Chamber II unsealed the arrest warrants and concluded that, 
“there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the five LRA leaders “ordered the 
commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”195 Moreover, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber issued requests that, warrants for the arrest and surrender of the five commanders 
be transmitted to the Uganda as well as DRC and the Sudan, because it was established that 
the LRA has additional bases in these States and that the indicted individuals move between 
them.196 Moreover, Sudan, signed an ad hoc agreement with the OTP to surrender any 
indicted LRA leader.197  
 
However, it was only Uganda which responded to the Prosecutor's request for an update on 
the status of warrant execution in those three States.198 As a States Party, Uganda has made 
the significant efforts to capture the five indictees. It communicated with the governments of 
the DRC and the Sudan, as well as with MONUC and the UN peacekeeping forces in the 
Sudan (UNMIS), to coordinate actions against the LRA.199  
 
Following the request by the OTP, on 1 June 2006 the International Criminal Police 
Organisation (INTERPOL) also issued Red Notices for the arrest and detention of those 
named in the warrant to be transmitted to National Central Bureaux in 184 
                                                            
195 See “Warrant of Arrest unsealed against five LRA Commanders” ICC-CPI-20051014-110 
<http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/related
%20cases/icc%200204%200105/press%20releases/warrant%20of%20arrest%20unsealed%20against%20five%
20lra%20commanders> [Accessed on 12 September 2009].  
196 See Minogue Supra note 152,660. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid. 
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countries.200Among those individuals, however, apart from Raska Lukwiya, who has been 
confirmed dead and proceedings against him have been discontinued and the warrant of 
arrest rendered ineffective, the other indictees remain at large.201  
 
Despite its continued attempt to capture these individuals, Uganda has mixed views about 
the unexecuted arrest warrants.202 The Ugandan government has said that it will ‘consider’ 
dropping the ICC's charges against Kony if he surrenders.203 On 26 August 2006 Ugandan 
officials and LRA representatives signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Juba, 
Southern Sudan.204 As part of the peace deal, the Ugandan government delegation offered 
‘total amnesty’ to all LRA combatants, including the five LRA leaders.205 However, the 
peace process had failed to gain the agreement of LRA leader Kony, who refused to sign the 
agreement unless the arrest warrant issued against him and other LRA leaders were lifted 
first, and began consolidating his forces in the DRC.206   
 
                                                            
200 The INTERPOL Red Notice system is part of its global network of law enforcement agencies, created to 
assist in tracing and arresting internationally wanted fugitives. See “Interpol issues first ICC Red Notices” 
<http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/related
%20cases/icc%200204%200105/press%20releases/interpol%20issues%20first%20icc%20red%20notices> 
[Accessed on 14 September 2009]. 
201The ICC is awaiting confirmation of Vincent Otti's death, who reportedly has been killed under orders of 
Kony in October 2007, before ending proceedings against him. See “ICC Registry officials meet with Lord’s 
Resistance Army Delegation”  
<http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/related
%20cases/icc%200204%200105/press%20releases/icc%20registry%20officials%20meet%20with%20lord’s%20
resistance%20army%20delegation> [Accessed on 14 September 2009]. 
202 See Minogue Supra note 152, 661. 
203 Ibid. 
204 See “The Armed conflict in Northern Uganda” 
<http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGAFR590082007&lang=e> [Accessed on 12 September 
2009]. 
205 Ssenyonjo, M “The International Criminal Court and The Lord’s Resistance Army Leaders: Prosecution or 
Amnesty?”(2007) 51 Netherlands International Law Review 80, 54. 
206“The Situation” <http://www.resolveuganda.org/situation> [Accessed on 22 September 2009]. 
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The prospects of reaching a peace agreement deteriorated further. In December 2008, a 
failed Ugandan-led military offensive against the LRA’s Congolese bases caused an 
immense increase of violence, as the latter responded by ordering massive retaliatory attacks 
on civilians in some areas of the DRC and Sudan, which within a short period of time killed 
and displaced many people.207 In March 2009, the Ugandan army ended its offensive after 
failing to capture the top LRA commanders, who continue to order attacks against 
communities in the region.208 In this situation, the Chamber has not established any refusal 
to co-operate.209 As in the case of the DRC, even though UNMIS and MONUC can provide 
assistance, they were limited by the Security Council, to perform other tasks in the region 
for the purpose of which they were deployed.210  
   
          4.4 Central African Republic 
 
At the end of 2002 and in the beginning of 2003, a large number of civilians were killed and 
raped during an armed conflict between the government of the Central African Republic 
(CAR) and rebel forces, after a failed coup attempt.211 On 21 December 2004, the CAR 
which is a States Party to the ICC, referred the crimes committed on the country’s territory 
since 1 July 2002 to the prosecutor of the Court. 
  
On 23 May 2008, Pre-Trial Chamber III issued a sealed arrest warrant on the basis that 
there were reasonable grounds to believe that, in the context of a protracted armed conflict 
                                                            
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 See Kaul Supra note 170, 97. 
210 See Minogue Supra note 152,662. 
211 See “The Current Investigation by the ICC of the Situations in the Central African Republic” 
<http://www.amicc.org/docs/Central%20African%20Republic.pdf> [Accessed on 14 September 2009]. 
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in the CAR Mouvement du Libération du Congo (MLC) forces led by Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, carried out civilian attacks including acts of rape, torture, outrages upon personal 
dignity and pillaging committed in the localities of PK 12, Bossongoa and Mongoumba.212  
 
On 24 May 2008, Belgian authorities arrested Bemba on six counts of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in the CAR. The judges of Pre-Trial 
Chamber III requested the kingdom of Belgium to surrender Bemba on 10 June 2008. With 
the support of the Dutch authorities, Belgium co-operated by transferring him to the ICC on 
3 July 2008.213 The initial appearance of Bemba was held before Pre-Trial Chamber III on 4 
July 2008.214  
 
Pre-Trial Chamber II conducted and finalised the confirmation of hearing on 15 June 2009 
and sent Bemba’s case to trial.215 On 14 August 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber III, to whom the 
situation was assigned on 19 March 2009, decided to grant Bemba an interim release. 
However, it was decided that he will not be released until a State agrees to host him. The 
                                                            
212 Pre-Trial Chamber III found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Bemba, as President and 
Commander in Chief of the MLC, was vested with ‘de facto’ and ‘de jure authority’ by the members of the MLC 
to take all political and military decisions. See The Prosecutor v. Jean‐Pierre Bemba Gombo (Warrant of Arrest 
replacing the warrant of arrest issued on 23 May 2008) ICC-01/05-01/08-15 Available at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc504390.PDF> [Accessed on 12 September 2009]. 
213See “OTP on Jean-Pierre Bemba surrender: this is a day for the victims” ICC-OTP-20080703-PR336 
<http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200105/related
%20cases/icc%200105%200108/press%20releases/otp%20on%20jean_pierre%20bemba%20surrender%20_%2
0this%20is%20a%20day%20for%20the%20victims>[Accessed on 14 September 2009]. 
214See<http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0105/Related
+Cases/ICC+0105+0108/Case+The+Prosecutor+v+Jean-Pierre+Bemba+Gombo.htm> [Accessed on 2009]. 
215 The Chamber confirmed two counts of crimes against humanity (rape and murder) and three counts of war 
crimes (rape, murder and pillaging) and that Bemba would be criminally responsible as a commander 
(pursuant to article 28(a) of the Rome Statute). See The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo “Decision 
Pursuant to Article 61(7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo” Available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc699541.pdf> [Accessed on 14 
September 2009]. 
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Chamber has to determine to which State and under which conditions he will be released 
provisionally.216 His trial is scheduled to start in 2010. Once his trial is set to open in The 
Hague, authorities of the host State have the obligation to surrender him back to the 
Court.217 
 
      4.5   Sudan 
 
Unlike DRC, CAR and Uganda, Sudan is not a States Party to the ICC. It was the Security 
Council, acting under its Chapter VII powers, which referred the violent atrocities 
committed in Darfur (the western region of Sudan) to the ICC, on 31 March 2005.218 In 
Resolution 1593, the Security Council ordered that "the Government of Sudan and all other 
parties to the conflict of Darfur shall co-operate fully" with the ICC and the 
Prosecutor. Furthermore, the Security Council urged all non-States Parties to co-operate 
fully, even though they do not have any obligation to do so under the Rome Statute. Unlike 
States Parties, Sudan is thus bound to co-operate with the Court by the terms of Security 
Council Resolution.219  
 
                                                            
216 The ICC Prosecutor has also announced that he will appeal the decision. However, States currently under 
consideration are Belgium, Portugal, France, Germany, South Africa, The Netherlands and Italy. See 
<http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200105/related
%20cases/icc%200105%200108/press%20releases/icc%20prosecutor_%20no%20temporary%20release%20for
%20jean_pierre%20bemba> [Accessed on 14 September 2009].   
217 Ibid. 
218 A UN Commission of Inquiry was established in 2004 to investigate alleged human rights violations in 
Darfur, which in its report issued in January 2005 found that government forces had been involved in 
atrocities which it catagorised variously as crimes against humanity and war crimes. See Totten, CD and 
Tyler, N “Arguing For An Integrated Approach to Resolving the Crisis in Darfur: The Challenges of 
Complementarity, Enforcement, And Related Issues In the International Criminal Court” (2008) 98 J Crim. L. 
& Criminology 1069, 1083. 
219 In principle, Sudan’s duty to assist the Court in discharging its functions prevails over its obligations under 
any other international agreement, in accordance with Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter. 
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On 2 May 2007, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued two warrants for the arrest of Ahmad 
Muhammad Harun (Ahmad Harun), who was then Minister of State for Humanitarian 
Affairs and  who is currently designated as the governor of South Kordofan State220 and the 
leader of the Janjaweed Militia Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, also known as Ali Kushayb.221  The Pre-
Trial Chamber concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that, these individuals 
committed crimes against humanity and war crimes that include persecution, torture, rape 
and murder.222  
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber ordered that, the Registrar prepare two requests for co-operation 
seeking the arrest and surrender of Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, containing the relevant 
information and documents, and transmit such requests to the competent Sudanese 
authorities, all States Parties to the Rome Statute, all UN Security Council members that are 
not States Parties to the Rome Statute and to other four countries specifically mentioned: 
Egypt; Eritrea; Ethiopia; and Libya.223 
                                                            
220 “On 7 May 2009 the Sudanese President, Al Bashir, reshuffled his cabinet.” See  Sudan Watch 
 <http://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2009/05/ahmed-mohamed-haroun-designated-as.html> [Accessed on 15 
September 2009]. 
221 The Prosecutor v Ahmad Muhammad Harun ‘Ahmad Harun’ and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman ‘Ali Kushayb’ 
(Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Harun) ICC-02/05-01/07-2 Available at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279813.PDF>; The Prosecutor v Ahmad Muhammad Harun ‘Ahmad 
Harun’ and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman ‘Ali Kushayb’ (Warrant of Arrest for Ali Kushayb) ICC-02/05-01/07-
3 Available at < http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279858.PDF>; [Accessed on 9 September 2009]. 
222 The warrant of arrest for Ahmad Muhammad Harun lists 42 counts on the basis of his individual criminal 
responsibility (articles 25(3)(b) and 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute) including: 20 counts of crimes against 
humanity and 22 counts of war crimes. The warrant of arrest for Ali Kushayb lists 50 counts on the basis of his 
individual criminal responsibility including: 22 counts of crimes against humanity and 28 counts of war 
crimes.  
223 See “Warrants of Arrest for the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs of Sudan, and a leader of the 
Militia/Janjaweed” ICC-OTP-20070502-214   
<http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related
%20cases/icc%200205%200107/press%20releases/warrants%20of%20arrest%20for%20the%20minister%20of
%20state%20for%20humanitarian%20affairs%20of%20sudan_%20and%20a%20leader%20of%20the> 
[Accessed 14 September on 2009].    
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Sudan has made it clear it will not hand over the two suspects, arguing that the Court has no 
jurisdiction over its citizens.224 In its Sixth Report to the Security Council of 5 December 
2007, the OTP reported that the Government of Sudan was not co-operating and that 
attacks on civilians and the humanitarian crisis were continuing in Darfur.225 These findings 
were restated in the Prosecutor's Seventh Report of 5 June 2008, concluding with a call to 
the Security Council to take action.226 On 16 June 2008, and in response thereto, the 
President of the Security Council, on behalf of the Council recalled its decision under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter in Resolution 1593 (2005) and “urge[d] the Government of 
Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur to co-operate fully”.227  
 
Similarly, the 9th report of the OTP of 5 June 2009 also reiterated the same finding of non 
co-operation, and ended by stating that “The Security Council might find it timely to start 
work on defining a framework to assist in the implementation of UNSC 1593 and the 
judicial decisions, which have followed in relation to Darfur, and to enhance the co-
operation of all parties concerned.”228 
 
                                                            
224 See “UNAMID” Troops’ Obligation to Apprehend ICC Suspects in Darfur” 
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25935> [Accessed on 15 September 2009]. 
225 See Sixth Report of The Prosecutor of The International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council 
Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D084A825-A985-4068-8320-
5724AA894430/277791/OTPRP20071205UNSCENG.pdf> [Accessed on 15 September2009]. 
226 See Seventh Report of The Prosecutor of The International Criminal Court to The UN Security Council 
Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005). 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/7thUNSCversionsenttoUN29may.pdf> [Accessed on 15 September 
2009]. 
227 Ninth Report of The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant 
to UNSCR 1593 (2005). Available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6FE9E52-4845-41BA-A45D-
75BA41D8647C/280448/9th_UNSCReport_Eng1.pdf> [Accessed on 15 September2009]. 
228 Ibid. 
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The Pre-Trial Chamber I, in issuing the third warrant of arrest in the situation in Darfur, on 
Al Bashir, also found that the Government of Sudan has “systematically refused to co-
operate” with the Court since the issuing of the two warrants of arrest. As a result, the 
judges emphasised that, according to Article 87(7) of the Statute, if the Government of 
Sudan continues to fail to comply with its co-operation obligations to the Court, the 
competent Chamber “may make a finding to that effect” and decide to “refer the matter […] 
to the Security Council.”229 So far, however, no finding has been made and no measure has 
yet been taken, and the arrest warrants remain unexecuted. While the African Union (AU) 
has had troops in Darfur since 2004, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which were 
replaced by UNAMID in 2007, apart from being repeatedly challenged by Sudan, the 
mandate of the troops has been strictly limited and does not include arresting suspects 
sought by the Court.230 
 
           4.5.1 The Al Bashir case 
 
On 4 March 2009 Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, President of Sudan. This is the first arrest warrant ever issued for a sitting 
Head of State by the ICC. He is suspected of being criminally responsible, as an indirect 
                                                            
229 See “ICC issues a warrant of arrest for Omar Al Bashir, President of Sudan” <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/press%20releases/icc%20
issues%20a%20warrant%20of%20arrest%20for%20omar%20al%20bashir_%20president%20of%20sudan>[Ac
cessed on 14 September 2009]. 
230 See Roper and Barria Supra note 25, 472. It was formally established by the Security Council resolution 
1769, on 31 July 2007, which authorised the establishment of the African Union/UN Hybrid operation in 
Darfur, referred to as UNAMID, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, for an initial period of 12 months. 
UNAMID formally took over from AMIS on 31 December 2007. The mandate was extended on 31 July 2008 
with the adoption of Security Council resolution 1828 for a further 12 months, until 31 July 2009. See  
“UNMID”<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/background.html> [Accessed on 15 
September 2009].  
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(co)perpetrator, on seven charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes.231 The Pre-
Trial Chamber directed the Registrar to prepare a request for co-operation, seeking his arrest 
and surrender that must be circulated to the competent Sudanese authorities, all States 
Parties to the Rome Statute, and all UN Security Council members that are not States 
Parties to the Rome Statute.232  In addition, it instructed the Registrar, as appropriate, to 
prepare and transmit to any other State, an additional request for arrest and surrender, 
which may be necessary for the arrest and surrender of Al Bashir.233 
 
As in other cases, the Pre-Trial Chamber has issued the warrant of arrest because it 
determined that, there are reasonable grounds to believe that Al Bashir has committed 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court and that his arrest is necessary to ensure his 
appearance.234 Moreover, according to the Pre-Trial Chamber, Al Bashir’s official capacity 
as a sitting Head of State does not exclude his criminal responsibility, nor does it grant him 
                                                            
231The warrant of arrest for Al Bashir lists seven counts on the basis of his  individual criminal responsibility 
under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome  Statute as an indirect (co) perpetrator including: five counts of crimes 
against humanity: murder - Article 7(1)(a); extermination - Article 7(1)(b); forcible transfer – Article 7(1)(d); 
torture - Article 7(1)(f); and rape - Article 7(1)(g); two counts of war crimes: intentionally directing attacks 
against a civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking part in  
hostilities -Article 8(2)(e)(i); and pillaging - Article 8(2)(e)(v). See The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad AL 
Bashir (Omar AL Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09 Available at 
<http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf> [Accessed on 10 September 2009]. The Prosecutor has 
appealed against the decision not to charge Al Bashir with the crime of genocide. The judges want the 
prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Al Bashir committed genocide, which according to the 
Prosecutor is "[…] the level of evidence required at the trial stage, not at the beginning of the process."  
See <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/07/08/sudan.bashir.war.crimes/index.html> [Accessed 
on 22 September 2009]. 
232 See “ICC issues a warrant of arrest for Omar Al Bashir President of Sudan” <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/0EF62173-05ED-403A-80C8-F15EE1D25BB3.htm> [Accessed on 10 September 2009]. 
233 Ibid. 
234 See Ciampi, A “The Proceedings Against President Al Bashir and the Prospect of Their Suspension Under 
Article 16 of the Statute” (2008) 6 J.Int’l Crim. Just.885, 885. See also The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad AL 
Bashir (Omar AL Bashir) Supra note 231. 
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immunity against prosecution before the ICC.235 However, this had triggered 
diverse reactions from States, international organisations and other international actors.236  
 
Following the decision in relation to the application made on 14 July 2008 by the 
Prosecutor for a Warrant of Arrest against Al Bashir, the African Union Peace and Security 
Council on 21 July 2008 called the request a threat to peace in the region and appealed to 
the UN Security Council to ask the ICC to suspend action for at least 12 months, by 
exercising its power to suspend proceedings or investigations by the Court under Article 16 
of the Rome Statute.237 
 
The same position was adopted by the Assembly of the Union in February 2009, which 
justified the call for deferral by arguing that, if the arrest warrant were approved, it "would 
seriously undermine the ongoing efforts aimed at facilitating the early resolution of the 
conflict in Darfur"238 Moreover, by subscribing to the argument that the ICC was targeting 
Africa for political reasons, it asked the AU Commission to promptly convene a meeting of 
African States Parties to discuss on the work of the ICC in relation to Africa.239 The meeting 
                                                            
235 See Supra note 231. 
236 While the USA, Canada, the UK and other EU countries support the warrant, China, the Arab League and 
the African Union (AU), saw the indictment as an attempt to destabilise Sudan and worsen the already 
complicated political atmosphere in Africa.  
See “Sudan ICC’s Arrest Warrant on Al Bashir” <http://allafrica.com/stories/200903200400.html> 
[Accessed on 12 September 2009]. 
237 Peace and Security Council142nd Meeting, PSC/MIN/Comm (CXLII) 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/AU_142-communique-eng.pdf> [Accessed on 12 September 2009].  
238 Assembly of the Union, Decision on the Application by the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor 
for the Indictment of the President of the Republic of the Sudan, AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 221(XII) (3 
February 2009). 
239 See “The African Union” <http://www.asil.org/rio/africanunion_sum09.html> [Accessed on 14 
September 2009]. 
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took place on 8 and 9 June 2009, but surprisingly ended by reaffirming a commitment to the 
Court.240  
 
However, the situation was completely different when the issue was deliberated during the 
13th Assembly Session on 1-3 July 2009. The Assembly adopted a decision, in which it 
determined that, member States would not co-operate with the ICC ,which in other words 
means that, Al Bashir may travel freely across Africa without fear of being arrested and 
surrendered to the ICC.241 In making the decision, it cited Article 98 of the Rome Statute, 
which states that "the Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance, 
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person […], unless 
the Court can first obtain the co-operation of that third State for the waiver of the 
immunity." However, as has been discussed in the previous chapter in relation to the 
application of this provision, in deciding to make the request, it is for the Court to determine 
whether immunity is applicable in the particular situation (which in this case the Pre-Trial 
Chamber I did). 
 
It is submitted that this resolution is in violation of the obligation of the 30 African States 
Parties to fully co-operate with the Court in the arrest and surrender of suspects. In this 
regard, South Africa formally announced that it will not abide by the AU resolution taken to 
                                                            
240 Ibid. 
241 Decision On The Meeting of African States Parties to The Rome Statute of The International Criminal 
Court (ICC) Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) Available at 
<http://www.africaunion.org/root/AU/Conferences/2009/july/summit/decisions/ASSEMBLY%20AU%2
0DEC%20243%20-%20267%20(XIII)%20_E.PDF> [Accessed on 14 September 2009]. 
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stop co-operation with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of Al Bashir.242 A similar view 
was also expressed by the governments of Botswana243 and Uganda.244 Since the issuing of 
the arrest warrant, Al Bashir has limited his visit to non-States Parties. These countries are 
Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe.245  
 
In the situation in Darfur, despite the Security Council’s referral, none of the arrest warrants 
issued have been executed, nor has any action taken so far. What rather proved successful 
was the summons which was unsealed on 17 May 2009, and which had been issued for the 
first time on 7 May 2009 for Bahr Idriss Abu Garda. Abu Garda is charged with three 
counts of war crimes allegedly committed during an attack carried out on 29 September 
2007 against the AU peace-keeping Mission in Sudan (AMIS), stationed at the Military 
Group Site Haskanita (MGS Haskanita) in North Darfur.246 The suspect appeared 
voluntarily before Pre-Trial Chamber I, on 18 May 2009. The confirmation of hearing is 
scheduled for 19 October 2009. Currently, Pre-Trial Chamber I is also reviewing the 
                                                            
242 See “South Africa legally rebuts AU resolution on arresting Bashir”  
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article31996> [Accessed on 14 September 2009]. 
243 See “Botswana Faults African Union Decision over Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir” 
<http://www.somalipress.com/news/2009-jul-06/botswana-faults-african-union-decision-over-sudanese-
president-omar-al-bashir.html>[Accessed on 14 September 2009]. 
244 See <http://blog.taragana.com/n/uganda-willing-to-arrest-sudanese-president-al-bashir-on-international-
war-crimes-warrant-108093/> [Accessed on 17 September 2009]. 
245 Al Bashir was attending a two-day Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa summit Zimbabwe 
was hosting in the northwestern resort town of Victoria Falls. See <http://blog.taragana.com/n/indicted-
sudanese-leader-al-bashir-arrives-in-zimbabwe-for-regional-economic-summit-74385/> [Accessed on 20 
September 2009]. 
246 Pre-Trial Chamber I, determined that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Abu Garda is criminally 
responsible for the war crimes of: violence to life, in the form of murder, whether committed or attempted, 
within the meaning of article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute; intentionally directing attacks against personnel, 
installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a peacekeeping mission within the meaning of article 
8(2)(e)(iii) of the Statute; and pillaging, within the meaning of article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute. See The 
Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda ICC-02/05-02/09.  
See<http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0205/Related+
Cases/ICC02050209/ICC02050209.htm> [Accessed on 17 September 2009]. 
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Prosecutor’s application, submitted on 20 November 2008, for the issuing of warrants of 
arrest or, alternatively, summonses to appear for two other individuals who allegedly 
participated in the attack on MGS Haskanita.247 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
247 “New suspect in the situation in Darfur, Sudan: First appearance scheduled for Monday, 18 May 2009” 
<http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/new%20suspect%20in%20the
%20situation%20of%20darfur_%20sudan_%20initial%20appearance%20hearing%20scheduled%20on%20mon
day%2018%20may?lan=en-GB>[Accessed on 17 September 2009].  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
The ICC was established with the chief aim of eradicating impunity, by punishing 
perpetrators of the heinous crimes within its jurisdiction. These crimes are crimes against 
humanity, war crime and genocide. In order to dispense justice, however, the Court has to 
secure the appearance of these individuals before it. As the ICC is not allowed to hold trials 
in the absence of the accused, and given the fact that the Court does not have its own police, 
military or law enforcement forces, it has to rely completely on the co-operation of States, 
for the arrest and surrender of suspects. As demonstrated in the discussion above, while the 
Court represents the judicial pillar, States represent the enforcement pillar on the basis of 
which the Court stands. 
 
For its effectiveness, the co-operation regime of the Rome Statue has laid down a clear 
obligation for States Parties to co-operate fully with the Court, with a corresponding duty to 
enact an implementing domestic legislation. Once the Court requests the co-operation of a 
States Party, with respect to the arrest and surrender of suspects, it does not allow for any 
exceptions. The Court will, however, first address the possible grounds for refusal. Non-
States Parties on the other hand have no obligation to co-operate under the Statute, unless 
they enter into an ad hoc arrangement with the Court, or the Security Council referred the 
matter under its Chapter VII power and decides that they shall co-operate with the Court. 
Furthermore, the Statute provides the possibility, for the Court to secure the co-operation of 
international/intergovernmental organisations.  
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Having established such a clear duty, while the ICC may issue requests and make orders for 
the surrender of accused persons, it has no direct sanctioning capacity beyond the threat of 
reporting non-compliance to the ASP’s or the Security Council, depending on who referred 
the matter to the Court. Moreover, the consequence of States that do not comply with the 
duty to co-operate is not specified under the Statute. In cases where States Parties referred 
the matter, it is left to the ASP’s to determine the Sanction to be applied.  On the other 
hand, Security Council can theoretically back up its referrals with its Chapter VII authority. 
“Under the current structure of the ICC and in the current political climate however, 
Security Council referrals to the ICC are not more enforceable than State Party referrals.”248 
This is evident from the fact that, none of the arrest warrant issued in relation to the 
atrocities committed in Darfur, which the Council referred, have been executed and noting 
has been done to remedy the problem until now. This is because the Security Council has 
not chosen to exercise its Chapter VII powers apart from the referral itself.  
 
What is more, is that the Security Council has referred a very difficult situation to the Court, 
without proper reflection as to the applicable legal co-operation instrument to discharge its 
mandate effectively.249 This makes it uncertain to what degree Sudan is under a legal 
obligation to provide legal assistance to the Court. This is a particularly intractable problem 
given the fact that domestic law is relied upon heavily. This means that the Court will have 
a difficult job in determining that national decisions were wrong. It is important that the 
legal regime is clarified and adhered to properly. 
 
                                                            
248 See Minogue Supra note 152,680. 
249 See Sluiter Supra note 103, 884. 
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Moreover, it has been discussed above that, there are many States Parties, mostly African 
countries, that do not have an implementing legislation yet, despite their duty under the 
Statute. This will have a negative impact on the enforcement of the Court’s decision. This is, 
of course, with the recognition of the fact that, effectiveness for a successful enforcement is 
more dependent upon other practical factors. The following recommendation is thus not 
limited to the legal aspect of the co-operation regime, but a reflection of the entire 
observation made in this study. It thus relates to the measure that need to be considered by 
the ASP’s, the Security Council and the Court. 
 
To begin with the legal aspect, Security Council, when referring situations to the Court 
should make a clear choice as to the appropriate co-operation regime. If the Rome Statute is 
to apply in substance to non-States Parties, it should be explicitly stated. Otherwise the 
Security Council should state categorically another regime which it considered more 
appropriate. In this regard, it is important to recongise that, Part 9 of the Statute is not very 
helpful for Security Council referrals affecting non-States Parties and unco-operative States. 
It is therefore necessary to re-examine Part 9 in light of the Court's experiences with the 
Darfur situation, and include more corrective mechanisms in relation to clearly unco-
operative States.250 Taking into consideration the fact that, unco-operative States could use 
some deficiencies in the co-operation regime to its advantage, it is very important to 
introduce a degree of flexibility regarding the co-operation law applicable in such cases and 
provide for stronger corrective mechanisms in relation to the reference to national law.251 
                                                            
250 Ibid. 
251 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, in relation to States Parties that do not have a domestic legislation, best 
practices should be identified and States should be assisted in drafting and introducing 
implementing legislation.252 
 
Most importantly, the Court should not tolerate refusals to co-operate. A refusal to co-
operate should be dealt with immediately, using the available enforcement procedure, 
which, as mentioned above, and as set out in Article 87(7), is to report the matter to the 
Assembly or the Security Council. Postponing this procedure creates the impression that 
instances of refusal are tolerated. This seems to be the case in the Darfur situation, where, 
despite the repeated notification by the Prosecutor of a lack of co-operation from Sudan, the 
Court has postponed making such a finding.  
 
Moreover, in many of the situations before the ICC, field missions of international 
organisations or peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations may have better access to a 
particular territory.253 In this regard securing their co-operation could become very 
important for the Court. It is evident from the discussion in the last chapter that, the 
mandates of peacekeeping missions have been strictly interpreted or not extended to provide 
co-operation in the arrest of indictees. The experience of the ICTY with SFOR has shown 
that the conclusion of such agreements will be particularly important where an international 
organisation is exercising military or law enforcement functions.254 Hence the Court or the 
                                                            
252 See Kaul Supra note 170,370 and Kaul Supra note 89,102 
253 See Rastan Supra note 56,445.  
254 Ibid. 
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Prosecutor should consider seeking the co-operation of such intergovernmental organisation 
that is consistent with the latter’s mandate. 
  
Currently some warrants of arrest remain unexecuted and in some of the situations 
atrocities have continued to be committed. Taking into consideration the fact that the U.S is 
not in support of the Court, the one aspect of which, as discussed in this study, is expressed 
by its signing of the bilateral immunity agreements, some argue that if the U.S reversed its 
position on the ICC, it could influence the Security Council to issue more effective 
resolutions that would raise the chances of States assisting the ICC in enforcing the arrest 
warrants. In this regard, there is a stronger reason to subscribe to the argument that, if 
investigations and prosecutions continue to stall because no arrest warrants are executed, 
and the ICC has no one to try in its investigations, then “the ICC should debate what 
modifications it could make to bring the U.S [to the Court], and as a consequence, what 
sacrifices it is willing to make to its own legitimacy.”255  
 
As a final remark, Summons is less confrontational and humiliating than arrest and could be 
seen a one step of a process, where the pressure might be increased over time. At least, it has 
proved effective in the Abu Garda case, in relation to the situation in Darfur, and hence, 
should therefore be seriously considered. 
 
The continued issuing and prompt execution of arrest warrants would enhance the ICC’s 
credibility significantly. In this regard, future co-operation with the ICC will strengthen the 
                                                            
255 See Minogue Supra note 152. 
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Court's effectiveness, while its lack will prevent the ICC from progressing with its mission to 
bring criminals to justice. The success of the ICC under these circumstances will depend 
upon real commitment and co-operation from States Parties. However, it is also important 
to take into account the above considerations.  
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